Tag: similar

Single Judge Application; Wait v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. (2020); The Court held in Wait v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 8, 17 (2020), that “[t]o establish the presence of a disability . . . there must be competent evidence specific to the claimant tending to show that his or her impairment rises to a level to affect earning capacity, which may include showing manifestations of a similar severity, frequency, and duration as those VA has determined by regulation would cause impaired earning capacity in an average person.”;
FedCir; Regents is an application of the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and this case is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A), which uses the same “arbitrary, capricious” language; we have used APA jurisprudence in applying the Title 38 provision. See Euzebio v. McDonough, 989 F.3d 1305, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The Veterans Court must also review Board and VA determinations for ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘arbitrary [and] capricious’ decision making, including whether the Board or VA[] entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem . . . .” (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A) and State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43)); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 432 n.2 (2011) (“[T]he Veterans Court’s scope of review, § 7261, is similar to that of an Article III court reviewing agency action under the [APA] . . . .”); Whether an agency has failed to address an important aspect of a problem, and is arbitrary and capricious for that reason, can turn on the specific statutes and regulations that govern the agency, see Oregon Natural Re-sources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.1996), but that does not distinguish 38 U.S.C. § 7261 from 5 U.S.C. § 706;

FedCir; Regents is an application of the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and this case is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A), which uses the same “arbitrary, capricious” language; we have used APA jurisprudence in applying the Title 38 provision. See Euzebio v. McDonough, 989 F.3d 1305, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The Veterans Court must also review Board and VA determinations for ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘arbitrary [and] capricious’ decision making, including whether the Board or VA[] entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem . . . .” (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A) and State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43)); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 432 n.2 (2011) (“[T]he Veterans Court’s scope of review, § 7261, is similar to that of an Article III court reviewing agency action under the [APA] . . . .”); Whether an agency has failed to address an important aspect of a problem, and is arbitrary and capricious for that reason, can turn on the specific statutes and regulations that govern the agency, see Oregon Natural Re-sources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.1996), but that does not distinguish 38 U.S.C. § 7261 from 5 U.S.C. § 706;

FedCir; Regents is an application of the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and this case is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A), which uses ...

Single Judge Application; Tedesco v. Wilkie; implicit bias against lay evidence; The Board’s analysis is substantially similar to the Board’s analysis in Tedesco v. Wilkie, where the Board noted an appellant’s reports of knee instability but found medical evidence more probative. 31 Vet.App. 360, 367 (2019). We ultimately remanded that claim, stating that “[t]he Board fail[ed] to explain why the medical findings are more probative, other than to assert that the ‘specific medical tests . . . are designed to reveal instability . . . of the joints.’” Id. Just as in Tedesco, the Board’s statement here, that “[t]he DBQs were completed by medical professionals who formulated their conclusions based on a physical examination, review of the record, and interview of the Veteran,” fails to suggest any actual reasons or bases for finding the lay statements outweighed by “significant objective evidence,” other than an implicit bias against lay evidence and a preference for medical evidence. R. at 8. The Board also failed to explain why it considered the appellant’s lay statements “generalized.”;
Single Judge Application; writ; The Board’s decision to remand this matter, in order to obtain additional, and impliedly negative evidence, is an exercise of “naked and arbitrary power.” See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 (1886) (Matthews, J.); In Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 1 (2009), we issued a writ even though the petitioner had the ability to appeal the matter to the Court. The circumstances here are similar in that regard and equally as egregious. This is illustrative of systemic legal errors that can be corrected in the context of a petition. See Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994, 1995 (2017)(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting the continuing “dialogue over whether the current system for adjudicating veterans disability claims can be squared with VA’s statutory obligations to assist veterans in the development of their disability claims.”); (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)(“Congress imposed on the VA an affirmative duty to assist—not impair—veterans seeking evidence for their disability claims.”). The conduct of VA here is certainly emblematic of a systemic, bureaucratic disorder, which we are uniquely ordained to deal with;
Single Judge Application; In Rizzo v. Shinseki, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that VA need not affirmatively establish an examiner’s competency. 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009), overruled by Francway v. Wilkie, 940 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding that the presumption of competency requires nothing more than is required for veterans in other contexts—i.e., simply that the veteran raise the issue—and that, once the veteran raises such a challenge, the presumption has no further effect and VA must satisfy its burden of persuasion as to the examiner’s qualifications). But, to the extent that Francway did not overrule the holding in Rizzo, the issue here is not the examiner’s competency; In addition, in Sickels v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit found unpersuasive the veteran’s argument—that he should not be required to assert that the examiner was insufficiently informed—because, like in Rizzo, he had not raised that concern before the Board. 643 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that an examiner’s competency and whether the examiner was sufficiently informed were similar in that a veteran must challenge both and, because Mr. Sickels had not done so, the Board was not required to address the issue of whether the examiner understood the adjudicator’s instructions);

Single Judge Application; In Rizzo v. Shinseki, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that VA need not affirmatively establish an examiner’s competency. 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009), overruled by Francway v. Wilkie, 940 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding that the presumption of competency requires nothing more than is required for veterans in other contexts—i.e., simply that the veteran raise the issue—and that, once the veteran raises such a challenge, the presumption has no further effect and VA must satisfy its burden of persuasion as to the examiner’s qualifications). But, to the extent that Francway did not overrule the holding in Rizzo, the issue here is not the examiner’s competency; In addition, in Sickels v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit found unpersuasive the veteran’s argument—that he should not be required to assert that the examiner was insufficiently informed—because, like in Rizzo, he had not raised that concern before the Board. 643 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that an examiner’s competency and whether the examiner was sufficiently informed were similar in that a veteran must challenge both and, because Mr. Sickels had not done so, the Board was not required to address the issue of whether the examiner understood the adjudicator’s instructions);

Single Judge Application; In Rizzo v. Shinseki, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that VA need not affirmatively establish an examiner’s competency. 580 F.3d 1288, ...

Single Judge Application; failure define term or degree; Mr. Thornton cites Johnson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 245, 255 (2018), arguing that the Board must disclose the standard under which it is operating. Appellant’s Br. at 26. But Johnson focused on a situation where the Board failed to define a term of degree (specifically, “very frequent”) that could be applied inconsistently across similar cases without a clear definition. 30 Vet.App. at 255;