Tag: require

Single Judge Application; reason and bases; Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001); failure discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant; Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994); the Board cannot “evade [its] statutory responsibility [to state the reasons or bases for its conclusions] merely by adopting [a medical opinion] as its own” where the medical opinion “fails to discuss all the evidence which appears to support [the] appellant’s position.” Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994). Gabrielson does not require that a medical opinion discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant, only that the Board, in relying on an opinion that does not do so, discuss any additional favorable evidence to comply with its duty to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its decision. See id.; 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); see also Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001) (holding that, although the Board must consider all of the evidence of record, “a discussion of all evidence is not required when . . . the Board has supported its decision with thorough reasons or bases regarding the relevant evidence”);
Hall v. McDonough, No. 19-8717 (Decided October 18, 2021); The particular form a claimant submits—correct or otherwise—has no bearing on the Board’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Although VA can require a claimant to fill out a particular form and can dismiss nonconforming or untimely filings in appropriate circumstances, none of this affects the Board’s jurisdiction to hear appeals of veterans benefits decisions. Only Congress (or the Constitution) can set the parameters for jurisdiction, so an agency can neither expand nor limit its own jurisdiction through regulation. And because there is no indication that Congress intended to limit the Board’s jurisdiction to cases where veterans fill out the correct form, we reverse the Board’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction and remand for further development.;
Single Judge Application; Davis v. McDonough, 34 Vet.App. 131, 132 (2021) (“Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b), when new and material evidence is submitted within the appeal period following a VA decision on a claim, the evidence must be considered in connection with that claim,” and “if VA fails to undertake that consideration, the claim remains pending until it does. Thus, when this rule is implicated, it can require the assignment of effective dates for benefits ultimately granted that are much earlier than would otherwise obtain.”);
“[P]rivate medical evidence since the initial exam that indicates the veteran’s medical history [] include[s] cold injury residuals [is] based upon his verbal history—not the evidence of record.” R. at 3583. There is no doubt that the RO’s distinction between the “evidence of record” and the veteran’s own statements was completely misleading at best. See 38 U.S.C.§ 5107(b) (requiring the Secretary to “consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case”); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that VA is required to give due consideration to all pertinent medical and lay evidence in evaluating a claim to disability or death benefits); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that””lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be considered, if submitted, when a veteran’s claim seeks disability benefits” and holding that, in certain situations, “competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself” to establish entitlement to such benefits). The language used in the request indicates that the veteran’s own statements are not “evidence of record” and would require at least corroboration in service medical records to be credible and probative. That is contrary to Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1335 (finding improper the Board’s determination that ‘lay statements lacked credibility merely because they were not corroborated by contemporaneous [SMRs]”).; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

“[P]rivate medical evidence since the initial exam that indicates the veteran’s medical history [] include[s] cold injury residuals [is] based upon his verbal history—not the evidence of record.” R. at 3583. There is no doubt that the RO’s distinction between the “evidence of record” and the veteran’s own statements was completely misleading at best. See 38 U.S.C.§ 5107(b) (requiring the Secretary to “consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case”); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that VA is required to give due consideration to all pertinent medical and lay evidence in evaluating a claim to disability or death benefits); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that””lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be considered, if submitted, when a veteran’s claim seeks disability benefits” and holding that, in certain situations, “competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself” to establish entitlement to such benefits). The language used in the request indicates that the veteran’s own statements are not “evidence of record” and would require at least corroboration in service medical records to be credible and probative. That is contrary to Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1335 (finding improper the Board’s determination that ‘lay statements lacked credibility merely because they were not corroborated by contemporaneous [SMRs]”).; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

Single Judge Application; Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009); The RO’s request distinguished between the veteran’s statements and the other evidence of record: “rivate medical ...

Single Judge Application; George v. McDonough, 991 F.3d 1227, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir. 2021) confirming that the law as it was understood at the time did not require VA to rebut the presumption of sound condition with clear and unmistakable evidence that the condition was not aggravated by service; 1970 presumption of sound condition; In 1970, VA’s implementing regulation did not require clear and unmistakable evidence of lack of aggravation by service for rebuttal. See 38 C.F.R. §3.304(b) (1970); Instead, if the presumption of sound condition applied, the burden fell on VA to rebut the presumption with clear and unmistakable evidence that an injury or disease that manifested in service preexisted service. See George, 991 F.3d at 1229-30 (noting that VA’s 1970 version of the regulation, permitting VA to rebut the presumption of soundness with only clear and unmistakable evidence that the disorder preexisted service, prevailed until 2003); 38 U.S.C. § 311 (1970) (current version § 1111); » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA