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Panel Application; educational benefits; 38 C.F.R. § 21.9635(o); Carr, 961 F.3d at 173; the Federal Circuit interpreted the phrase “may receive” as referring only to an initial calculation of a veteran’s entitlement and not to the amount of benefits that a person may, in fact, receive; It then concluded that the statute does not preclude an individual, who has accumulated and used a total of 48 months of educational benefits from a combination of chapters, from receiving an extension in benefits until the end of a semester. Carr, 961 F.3d at 173;
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMSNo. 16-3438SAMANTHA E. CARR, APPELLANT,V.DENIS MCDONOUGH,SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.ROBERT M. CARR, INTERVENOROn Remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal ...
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![Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the 1981 RO decision. Specifically, he contends that Wagner is an authoritative statement of what section 311 meant at the time of the 1981 RO decision. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6. The Court agrees with the appellant that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section 1111 in Wagner is an authoritative statement of what that statute has meant since the date of enactment in 1958. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d at 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We made clear . . . , that ‘[u]nlike changes in regulations and statutes, which are prospective, our interpretation of a statute is retrospective in that it explains what the statute has meant since the date of enactment.’” (quoting Patrick v. Nicholson, 242 F. App’x 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(remanding for further consideration of CUE request using the correct standard articulated in Wagner and directing remand to Board, if necessary, to determine whether the Secretary has rebutted the presumption of soundness by providing clear and unmistakable evidence that the presumption has been rebutted))); see also Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the appellant’s CUE request challenges the validity of a regulation but does not question the correct legal standard under the statute, and that “Wagner governs that issue”). Thus, the Court agrees with the appellant that the Board erred when it concluded that he could not challenge the correct legal standard that applies under section 1111 in the CUE context.;](https://hadit.com/wp-content/uploads/tshirt-Hadit.com-Business-Card-Back-3-1024x585.png)
