Tag: Condition

Secretary concession SMC part of every claim for increase; The Secretary further concedes that because SMC is an issue within an increased rating claim, the Board should have considered whether the appellant filed a claim for an increased disability rating for his left eye condition earlier than January 2014 or, at a minimum, considered 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2), which allows under certain circumstances an effective date up to 1 year prior to the date of a claim for increase. Secretary’s Br. at 9.; the Secretary further concedes that, to the extent that SMC may be considered part of a claim for increased compensation, see Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 118, 121 (1991) (concluding that the RO “should have inferred from the veteran’s request for an increase in benefits . . . a request for [SMC] whether or not it was placed in issue by the veteran”), the Board should have addressed whether the appellant sought SMC through an increased rating claim for his left eye disability prior to January 2014 or whether 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) applied. See Secretary’s Br. at 8-10. The Court will accept the Secretary’s concession, ;
Single Judge Application; Geib, 733 F.3d at 1354 (establishing that “applicable regulations place responsibility for the ultimate TDIU determination on the VA, not a medical examiner”); Board was therefore prohibited from characterizing their silence on the issue as substantive evidence against entitlement to TDIU; AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that “where a condition would not normally have been recorded, the Board may not consider the absence of [administrative record] evidence as substantive negative evidence of that condition.”); “[T]he absence of evidence on a particular question cannot be construed as negative evidence against a claimant unless there is a foundation in the record that demonstrates that such silence has a tendency to prove or disprove a relevant fact.” Delrio, 32 Vet.App. at 240 (citing Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015));
Panel Application; section 1155 directs the Secretary to establish in the rating schedule “ten grades of disability” for evaluating the severity of such conditions, the Secretary has provided less than ten levels of disability for most of the conditions listed in the schedule. See generally 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.71a – 4.150 (1992). Therefore, the schedular ratings established by the Secretary for compensation purposes may not in all cases provide a sufficiently comprehensive basis for determining when a measured worsening of a particular veteran’s condition in service constitutes an “increase in disability” for purposes of establishing service connection through aggravation under section 1153. This would seem to be so where the next higher rating is more than one decile greater. Furthermore, the rating-schedule provisions may not in all cases provide the most accurate or most logical basis for determining whether there has been an “increase in disability” during service. For example, with respect to organic mental disorders and psychoneurotic disorders, the rating schedule provides for disability ratings based on a finding that the condition causes “total”, “severe”, “considerable”, “definite”, or “mild” social and industrial impairment. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Codes 9300-9411 (1992);

Panel Application; section 1155 directs the Secretary to establish in the rating schedule “ten grades of disability” for evaluating the severity of such conditions, the Secretary has provided less than ten levels of disability for most of the conditions listed in the schedule. See generally 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.71a – 4.150 (1992). Therefore, the schedular ratings established by the Secretary for compensation purposes may not in all cases provide a sufficiently comprehensive basis for determining when a measured worsening of a particular veteran’s condition in service constitutes an “increase in disability” for purposes of establishing service connection through aggravation under section 1153. This would seem to be so where the next higher rating is more than one decile greater. Furthermore, the rating-schedule provisions may not in all cases provide the most accurate or most logical basis for determining whether there has been an “increase in disability” during service. For example, with respect to organic mental disorders and psychoneurotic disorders, the rating schedule provides for disability ratings based on a finding that the condition causes “total”, “severe”, “considerable”, “definite”, or “mild” social and industrial impairment. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Codes 9300-9411 (1992);

Panel Application; section 1155 directs the Secretary to establish in the rating schedule “ten grades of disability” for evaluating the severity of such conditions, the Secretary has provided less ...

Single Judge Application; English, 30 Vet.App. at 352-53; the Board must explain what it understands the terms “slight” and “moderate” in DC 5257 to mean so that appellant will understand why he was evaluated as he was, and the Court can review the Board’s decision; the Board focused on “objective evidence” in the VA medical opinions to support its conclusion that appellant’s instability was only “slight.”35 We can’t tell whether the Board faithfully applied English v. Wilkie or merely recited its holding concerning the lack of a requirement of objective evidence. On remand, the Board must ensure that it does not inappropriately downgrade evidence of instability merely because it is subjective. We stress again that it is inappropriate to categorically favor objective evidence of instability over subjective evidence of that condition. English, 30 Vet.App. at 352-53;
(1) is in writing; (2) indicates an intent to apply for veterans’ benefits; and (3) identifies the particular benefits sought.” Shea v. Wilkie, 926 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “[v]eteran need not refer explicitly to the name of an illness, injury, or condition” on his claim form. Sellers v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 1328, 1335 (Fed.Cir. 2020). A high level of generality will suffice, so long as the “benefit sought . . . can also be found indirectly through examination of evidence to which those documents themselves point when sympathetically read.” Shea, 926 F.3d at 1368 (internal quotation marks omitted).; Had Mr. Germany’s mental health records been before the RO in the first instance in evaluating his Claim, that might have been sufficient to qualify as an informal claim. See id. at 1370. In Shea, we held that the VA erred by not construing the veteran’s claim to cover psychiatric conditions referenced in her medical records but not explicitly listed on her claim form. Id; 2 In 2015, the VA implemented a rule that claims for disability benefits must be filed on a standard form and revised 38 C.F.R. § 3.155. See Standard Claims and Appeals Forms, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,660 (Sept. 25, 2014).
The examination report must include • an up-to-date, brief, medical and industrial history from the date of discharge or last examination • a record of subjective complaints • a complete description of objective findings, stated in concrete terms • a diagnosis for each described condition[] • answer(s) to any question specifically included in the examination request • opinions specifically requested in the exam request • a diagnosis or notation that a chronic disease or disability was ruled out for each disability, complaint, or symptom listed on the examination request, and • the clinical findings required by the rating schedule for the evaluation of the specific disability being claimed. (For example, if a joint is being examined, the range of motion in degrees should be noted as part of the examination. If a cardiovascular condition is being examined, the metabolic equivalent expanded before fatigue, chest pain, and so on, result should be expressed.); M21-1MR, pt. III, subpt. iv, ch. 3, sec. D(f); In response to the Court’s inquiry, counsel for the Secretary stated that this provision is intended to assist VA adjudicators in determining what constitutes a sufficient report of examination for compensation and pension purposes, but conceded that a particular VA medical record may still qualify as a “report of examination” under § 3.157(b)(1) even if it is not as detailed as required by this M21-1MR provision.;

The examination report must include • an up-to-date, brief, medical and industrial history from the date of discharge or last examination • a record of subjective complaints • a complete description of objective findings, stated in concrete terms • a diagnosis for each described condition[] • answer(s) to any question specifically included in the examination request • opinions specifically requested in the exam request • a diagnosis or notation that a chronic disease or disability was ruled out for each disability, complaint, or symptom listed on the examination request, and • the clinical findings required by the rating schedule for the evaluation of the specific disability being claimed. (For example, if a joint is being examined, the range of motion in degrees should be noted as part of the examination. If a cardiovascular condition is being examined, the metabolic equivalent expanded before fatigue, chest pain, and so on, result should be expressed.); M21-1MR, pt. III, subpt. iv, ch. 3, sec. D(f); In response to the Court’s inquiry, counsel for the Secretary stated that this provision is intended to assist VA adjudicators in determining what constitutes a sufficient report of examination for compensation and pension purposes, but conceded that a particular VA medical record may still qualify as a “report of examination” under § 3.157(b)(1) even if it is not as detailed as required by this M21-1MR provision.;

Panel Application; the Veterans Benefits Administration Adjudication Procedures Manual (M21-1MR) are intended to describe the type of VA medical record that qualifies as a “report of examination.” In particular, ...

Single Judge Application; Spellers v. Wilkie; the Court held in Spellers v. Wilkie, with respect to the diagnostic code for incomplete paralysis of the sciatic nerve, which also rates the condition based solely on the level of severity (i.e., mild, moderate, severe), the “lack of objective criteria for differentiating between the specified severity levels means that any evidence indicating severity of incomplete paralysis of the sciatic nerve is necessarily relevant to the schedular rating level.” 30 Vet.App. 211, 219 (2018) (emphasis omitted);
Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed in processing that claim; claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim; The Board did not, however, address the reasonably raised issue of whether the veteran’s specific claim for tinnitus encompassed a claim for a vestibular condition manifesting in dizziness, as required by Clemons. In Clemons, the Court explained that, because lay claimants generally lack the medical knowledge to narrow the universe of a claim to a particular diagnosis, VA “should construe a claim based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert, self-represented claimant and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth,” and factors relevant to that inquiry include “the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Id. The Court ultimately held that the Board may not deny a claim because a lay claimant’s hypothesized diagnosis proves incorrect; rather, the Board must “confront[] the difficult questions of what current []condition actually exist[s] and whether it was incurred in or aggravated by service.” Id. at 6. In so doing, the Board must make “affirmative finding[s] as to the nature of the [claimant’s] condition.” Id. In short, “the fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Id.; see generally Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim”).;

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed in processing that claim; claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim; The Board did not, however, address the reasonably raised issue of whether the veteran’s specific claim for tinnitus encompassed a claim for a vestibular condition manifesting in dizziness, as required by Clemons. In Clemons, the Court explained that, because lay claimants generally lack the medical knowledge to narrow the universe of a claim to a particular diagnosis, VA “should construe a claim based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert, self-represented claimant and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth,” and factors relevant to that inquiry include “the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Id. The Court ultimately held that the Board may not deny a claim because a lay claimant’s hypothesized diagnosis proves incorrect; rather, the Board must “confront[] the difficult questions of what current []condition actually exist[s] and whether it was incurred in or aggravated by service.” Id. at 6. In so doing, the Board must make “affirmative finding[s] as to the nature of the [claimant’s] condition.” Id. In short, “the fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Id.; see generally Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim”).;

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed ...

the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Clemons, 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth.” Id. To effectuate that intent, “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” Murphy, 983 F.3d at 1318. “[T]he fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Clemons, 23 Vet.App. at 6.; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
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