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Tag: Wilkie

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed in processing that claim; claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim; The Board did not, however, address the reasonably raised issue of whether the veteran’s specific claim for tinnitus encompassed a claim for a vestibular condition manifesting in dizziness, as required by Clemons. In Clemons, the Court explained that, because lay claimants generally lack the medical knowledge to narrow the universe of a claim to a particular diagnosis, VA “should construe a claim based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert, self-represented claimant and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth,” and factors relevant to that inquiry include “the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Id. The Court ultimately held that the Board may not deny a claim because a lay claimant’s hypothesized diagnosis proves incorrect; rather, the Board must “confront[] the difficult questions of what current []condition actually exist[s] and whether it was incurred in or aggravated by service.” Id. at 6. In so doing, the Board must make “affirmative finding[s] as to the nature of the [claimant’s] condition.” Id. In short, “the fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Id.; see generally Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim”).;

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed in processing that claim; claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim; The Board did not, however, address the reasonably raised issue of whether the veteran’s specific claim for tinnitus encompassed a claim for a vestibular condition manifesting in dizziness, as required by Clemons. In Clemons, the Court explained that, because lay claimants generally lack the medical knowledge to narrow the universe of a claim to a particular diagnosis, VA “should construe a claim based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert, self-represented claimant and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth,” and factors relevant to that inquiry include “the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Id. The Court ultimately held that the Board may not deny a claim because a lay claimant’s hypothesized diagnosis proves incorrect; rather, the Board must “confront[] the difficult questions of what current []condition actually exist[s] and whether it was incurred in or aggravated by service.” Id. at 6. In so doing, the Board must make “affirmative finding[s] as to the nature of the [claimant’s] condition.” Id. In short, “the fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Id.; see generally Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim”).;

by The Editor
October 16, 2021
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Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed ...

Single Judge Application; Bailey v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 188, 204 (2021) (noting that an RO decision granting benefits could not divest the Board of jurisdiction over the initial appeal and that, on remand, the appellant was entitled to have his appeal processed to completion thus preserving the possibility of an earlier effective date);

Single Judge Application; Bailey v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 188, 204 (2021) (noting that an RO decision granting benefits could not divest the Board of jurisdiction over the initial appeal and that, on remand, the appellant was entitled to have his appeal processed to completion thus preserving the possibility of an earlier effective date);

by The Editor
October 16, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; Bailey v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 188, 204 (2021) (noting that an RO decision granting benefits could not divest the Board of jurisdiction over the initial appeal ...

Single Judge Application; Tedesco v. Wilkie; implicit bias against lay evidence; The Board’s analysis is substantially similar to the Board’s analysis in Tedesco v. Wilkie, where the Board noted an appellant’s reports of knee instability but found medical evidence more probative. 31 Vet.App. 360, 367 (2019). We ultimately remanded that claim, stating that “[t]he Board fail[ed] to explain why the medical findings are more probative, other than to assert that the ‘specific medical tests . . . are designed to reveal instability . . . of the joints.’” Id. Just as in Tedesco, the Board’s statement here, that “[t]he DBQs were completed by medical professionals who formulated their conclusions based on a physical examination, review of the record, and interview of the Veteran,” fails to suggest any actual reasons or bases for finding the lay statements outweighed by “significant objective evidence,” other than an implicit bias against lay evidence and a preference for medical evidence. R. at 8. The Board also failed to explain why it considered the appellant’s lay statements “generalized.”;

Single Judge Application; Tedesco v. Wilkie; implicit bias against lay evidence; The Board’s analysis is substantially similar to the Board’s analysis in Tedesco v. Wilkie, where the Board noted an appellant’s reports of knee instability but found medical evidence more probative. 31 Vet.App. 360, 367 (2019). We ultimately remanded that claim, stating that “[t]he Board fail[ed] to explain why the medical findings are more probative, other than to assert that the ‘specific medical tests . . . are designed to reveal instability . . . of the joints.’” Id. Just as in Tedesco, the Board’s statement here, that “[t]he DBQs were completed by medical professionals who formulated their conclusions based on a physical examination, review of the record, and interview of the Veteran,” fails to suggest any actual reasons or bases for finding the lay statements outweighed by “significant objective evidence,” other than an implicit bias against lay evidence and a preference for medical evidence. R. at 8. The Board also failed to explain why it considered the appellant’s lay statements “generalized.”;

by The Editor
October 15, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; Tedesco v. Wilkie; implicit bias against lay evidence; The Board’s analysis is substantially similar to the Board’s analysis in Tedesco v. Wilkie, where the Board noted ...

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

by The Editor
October 13, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if ...

Single Judge Application; a MUCMI is “a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology[] that is characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs and has features such as fatigue, pain, disability out of proportion to physical findings, and inconsistent demonstration of laboratory abnormalities.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(ii). “Under the proper interpretation of the law, an illness is a MUCMI where either the etiology or pathophysiology of the illness is inconclusive.” Stewart v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 383, 390 (2018); “Conversely, a multisymptom illness is not a MUCMI where both the etiology and the pathophysiology of the illness are partially understood.” Id.; “[W]hether an illness is ‘defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms’ . . . is a question of fact delegated to the VA . . . for consideration in the first instance.” Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1338 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(2)(B)); » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

Single Judge Application; a MUCMI is “a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology[] that is characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs and has features such as fatigue, pain, disability out of proportion to physical findings, and inconsistent demonstration of laboratory abnormalities.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(ii). “Under the proper interpretation of the law, an illness is a MUCMI where either the etiology or pathophysiology of the illness is inconclusive.” Stewart v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 383, 390 (2018); “Conversely, a multisymptom illness is not a MUCMI where both the etiology and the pathophysiology of the illness are partially understood.” Id.; “[W]hether an illness is ‘defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms’ . . . is a question of fact delegated to the VA . . . for consideration in the first instance.” Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1338 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(2)(B)); » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

by The Editor
September 30, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; a MUCMI is “a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology[] that is characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs and has features such as fatigue, pain, ...

Single Judge Application; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Boggs v. Peake, 520 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir. 2008)); see Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399, 401-02 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In Murphy v. Wilkie, the Federal Circuit endorsed Clemons’s lenity rule and its teaching that a sympathetic reading of the scope of a veteran’s claim “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim.”;

Single Judge Application; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Boggs v. Peake, 520 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir. 2008)); see Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399, 401-02 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In Murphy v. Wilkie, the Federal Circuit endorsed Clemons’s lenity rule and its teaching that a sympathetic reading of the scope of a veteran’s claim “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim.”;

by The Editor
September 1, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Boggs v. Peake, 520 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir. 2008)); see Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399, ...

Single Judge Application; “The [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Federal Circuit made it clear that the Board is not bound by [M21-1] ; Overton, 30 Vet.App. at 264 (“[T]he Board is required to discuss any relevant provisions contained in the M21-1 . . . , but because it is not bound by those provisions, it must make its own determination before it chooses to rely on an M21-l provision . . . .”); It is unclear how the Board came to this conclusion that consistent and prolonged exposure was required because that language is not found within the M21-1 provision that was provided to appellant as a reference for establishing presumptive service connection; Andrews v. McDonough, __ Vet.App. , , No. 19-0352, 2021 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1091, at *17-20 (June 22, 2021) (“[T]he VA ma y [not] tell a veteran how to establish a service connection for his [condition] only to move the goalposts once he has done so. This kind of goalpost-moving does not reflect an optimal mode of administrative decisionmaking.” (quoting Hudick v. Wilkie, 755 F. App’x 998, 1006-07 (Fed. Cir. 2018)));

Single Judge Application; “The [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Federal Circuit made it clear that the Board is not bound by [M21-1] ; Overton, 30 Vet.App. at 264 (“[T]he Board is required to discuss any relevant provisions contained in the M21-1 . . . , but because it is not bound by those provisions, it must make its own determination before it chooses to rely on an M21-l provision . . . .”); It is unclear how the Board came to this conclusion that consistent and prolonged exposure was required because that language is not found within the M21-1 provision that was provided to appellant as a reference for establishing presumptive service connection; Andrews v. McDonough, __ Vet.App. , , No. 19-0352, 2021 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1091, at *17-20 (June 22, 2021) (“[T]he VA ma y [not] tell a veteran how to establish a service connection for his [condition] only to move the goalposts once he has done so. This kind of goalpost-moving does not reflect an optimal mode of administrative decisionmaking.” (quoting Hudick v. Wilkie, 755 F. App’x 998, 1006-07 (Fed. Cir. 2018)));

by The Editor
August 30, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; “The Federal Circuit made it clear that the Board is not bound by ; Overton, 30 Vet.App. at 264 (“he Board is required to discuss any relevant ...

Single Judge Application; writ; The Board’s decision to remand this matter, in order to obtain additional, and impliedly negative evidence, is an exercise of “naked and arbitrary power.” See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 (1886) (Matthews, J.); In Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 1 (2009), we issued a writ even though the petitioner had the ability to appeal the matter to the Court. The circumstances here are similar in that regard and equally as egregious. This is illustrative of systemic legal errors that can be corrected in the context of a petition. See Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994, 1995 (2017)(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting the continuing “dialogue over whether the current system for adjudicating veterans disability claims can be squared with VA’s statutory obligations to assist veterans in the development of their disability claims.”); (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)(“Congress imposed on the VA an affirmative duty to assist—not impair—veterans seeking evidence for their disability claims.”). The conduct of VA here is certainly emblematic of a systemic, bureaucratic disorder, which we are uniquely ordained to deal with;

Single Judge Application; writ; The Board’s decision to remand this matter, in order to obtain additional, and impliedly negative evidence, is an exercise of “naked and arbitrary power.” See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 (1886) (Matthews, J.); In Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 1 (2009), we issued a writ even though the petitioner had the ability to appeal the matter to the Court. The circumstances here are similar in that regard and equally as egregious. This is illustrative of systemic legal errors that can be corrected in the context of a petition. See Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994, 1995 (2017)(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting the continuing “dialogue over whether the current system for adjudicating veterans disability claims can be squared with VA’s statutory obligations to assist veterans in the development of their disability claims.”); (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)(“Congress imposed on the VA an affirmative duty to assist—not impair—veterans seeking evidence for their disability claims.”). The conduct of VA here is certainly emblematic of a systemic, bureaucratic disorder, which we are uniquely ordained to deal with;

by The Editor
August 23, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; writ; The Board’s decision to remand this matter, in order to obtain additional, and impliedly negative evidence, is an exercise of “naked and arbitrary power.” See Yick ...

Single Judge Application; In Rizzo v. Shinseki, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that VA need not affirmatively establish an examiner’s competency. 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009), overruled by Francway v. Wilkie, 940 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding that the presumption of competency requires nothing more than is required for veterans in other contexts—i.e., simply that the veteran raise the issue—and that, once the veteran raises such a challenge, the presumption has no further effect and VA must satisfy its burden of persuasion as to the examiner’s qualifications). But, to the extent that Francway did not overrule the holding in Rizzo, the issue here is not the examiner’s competency; In addition, in Sickels v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit found unpersuasive the veteran’s argument—that he should not be required to assert that the examiner was insufficiently informed—because, like in Rizzo, he had not raised that concern before the Board. 643 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that an examiner’s competency and whether the examiner was sufficiently informed were similar in that a veteran must challenge both and, because Mr. Sickels had not done so, the Board was not required to address the issue of whether the examiner understood the adjudicator’s instructions);

Single Judge Application; In Rizzo v. Shinseki, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that VA need not affirmatively establish an examiner’s competency. 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009), overruled by Francway v. Wilkie, 940 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding that the presumption of competency requires nothing more than is required for veterans in other contexts—i.e., simply that the veteran raise the issue—and that, once the veteran raises such a challenge, the presumption has no further effect and VA must satisfy its burden of persuasion as to the examiner’s qualifications). But, to the extent that Francway did not overrule the holding in Rizzo, the issue here is not the examiner’s competency; In addition, in Sickels v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit found unpersuasive the veteran’s argument—that he should not be required to assert that the examiner was insufficiently informed—because, like in Rizzo, he had not raised that concern before the Board. 643 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that an examiner’s competency and whether the examiner was sufficiently informed were similar in that a veteran must challenge both and, because Mr. Sickels had not done so, the Board was not required to address the issue of whether the examiner understood the adjudicator’s instructions);

by The Editor
August 23, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; In Rizzo v. Shinseki, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that VA need not affirmatively establish an examiner’s competency. 580 F.3d 1288, ...

Single Judge Application; failure define term or degree; Mr. Thornton cites Johnson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 245, 255 (2018), arguing that the Board must disclose the standard under which it is operating. Appellant’s Br. at 26. But Johnson focused on a situation where the Board failed to define a term of degree (specifically, “very frequent”) that could be applied inconsistently across similar cases without a clear definition. 30 Vet.App. at 255;

Single Judge Application; failure define term or degree; Mr. Thornton cites Johnson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 245, 255 (2018), arguing that the Board must disclose the standard under which it is operating. Appellant’s Br. at 26. But Johnson focused on a situation where the Board failed to define a term of degree (specifically, “very frequent”) that could be applied inconsistently across similar cases without a clear definition. 30 Vet.App. at 255;

by The Editor
August 23, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; failure define term or degree; Mr. Thornton cites Johnson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 245, 255 (2018), arguing that the Board must disclose the standard under which it ...

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