Tag: Single

Single Judge Application; Bailey v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 188, 204 (2021) (noting that an RO decision granting benefits could not divest the Board of jurisdiction over the initial appeal and that, on remand, the appellant was entitled to have his appeal processed to completion thus preserving the possibility of an earlier effective date);
Single Judge Application; Tedesco v. Wilkie; implicit bias against lay evidence; The Board’s analysis is substantially similar to the Board’s analysis in Tedesco v. Wilkie, where the Board noted an appellant’s reports of knee instability but found medical evidence more probative. 31 Vet.App. 360, 367 (2019). We ultimately remanded that claim, stating that “[t]he Board fail[ed] to explain why the medical findings are more probative, other than to assert that the ‘specific medical tests . . . are designed to reveal instability . . . of the joints.’” Id. Just as in Tedesco, the Board’s statement here, that “[t]he DBQs were completed by medical professionals who formulated their conclusions based on a physical examination, review of the record, and interview of the Veteran,” fails to suggest any actual reasons or bases for finding the lay statements outweighed by “significant objective evidence,” other than an implicit bias against lay evidence and a preference for medical evidence. R. at 8. The Board also failed to explain why it considered the appellant’s lay statements “generalized.”;
Single Judge Application; Tadlock remand from Federal Circuit; overlapping signs or symptoms; Veterans of the Gulf War can establish entitlement to service connection on a presumptive basis for “a qualifying chronic disability” that arises during service or to a compensable degree before December 31, 2026. 38 U.S.C. § 1117; 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(1)(i) (2021). A “qualifying chronic disability” is one that results from either an “undiagnosed illness” or a “medically unexplained chronic multisymptom illness [(MUCMI)] that is defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(i)(A)-(B). A MUCMI, inturn, is defined as “a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology, that is characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs and has features such as fatigue, pain, disability out of proportion to physical findings, and inconsistent demonstration of laboratory abnormalities.” Id. § 3.317(a)(2)(ii);
Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if ...

Single Judge Application; Shoemaker v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. 248, 253 (1992); Bankhead, 29 Vet.App. at 18-19; the criteria listed by the Board are those pertaining to the 100% rating under § 4.130, not the 70% rating the Board mislabeled it as. As a result, the Board didn’t properly consider if the veteran’s PTSD was more severe than a 50% rating but less severe than a 100% rating. When the veteran specifically requests an increase in his or her rating, the Board has an obligation to explain not only why the symptoms comport with the assigned rating criteria, but also why they don’t comport with the next higher disability rating criteria. Shoemaker v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. 248, 253 (1992); Bankhead, 29 Vet.App. at 18-19.;
Single Judge Application; hearing loss effective date; Swain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 219 (2015); in Swain v. McDonald the Court explained that 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 does not govern the effective date for hearing loss ratings. See 27 Vet.App. at 224-25. The Court held that the effective date for hearing loss may be earlier than the date of an audiometric test that satisfies the criteria under 38 C.F.R. § 4.85, and that, “unless otherwise specifically noted in the statute or regulation, [38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(3)] and [38 C.F.R.] § 3.400 govern the effective date for disability benefits claims.” Id. at 225. The Board noted some of Mr. Garcia’s statements about his worsening hearing loss before 2019, but the Board denied entitlement to a compensable rating before June 11, 2019, seemingly because the record did not contain any other “audiometric testing results during this portion of the appeal period which comply with 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 for rating purposes.” R. at 11.; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Single Judge Application; Board’s use of double negatives (“not shown” and “unable”); In Bowling, the Court found that the Board’s use of double negatives (“not shown” and “unable”) to suggest the feasibility of some of the veteran’s past occupations revealed that the Board relied on the lack of evidence rather than on any affirmative evidence of employability and that, with no such evidence, the Board’s speculation could not sustain a TDIU denial. Id. at 8.; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Single Judge Application; a MUCMI is “a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology[] that is characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs and has features such as fatigue, pain, disability out of proportion to physical findings, and inconsistent demonstration of laboratory abnormalities.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(ii). “Under the proper interpretation of the law, an illness is a MUCMI where either the etiology or pathophysiology of the illness is inconclusive.” Stewart v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 383, 390 (2018); “Conversely, a multisymptom illness is not a MUCMI where both the etiology and the pathophysiology of the illness are partially understood.” Id.; “[W]hether an illness is ‘defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms’ . . . is a question of fact delegated to the VA . . . for consideration in the first instance.” Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1338 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(2)(B)); » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Single Judge Application; George v. McDonough, 991 F.3d 1227, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir. 2021) confirming that the law as it was understood at the time did not require VA to rebut the presumption of sound condition with clear and unmistakable evidence that the condition was not aggravated by service; 1970 presumption of sound condition; In 1970, VA’s implementing regulation did not require clear and unmistakable evidence of lack of aggravation by service for rebuttal. See 38 C.F.R. §3.304(b) (1970); Instead, if the presumption of sound condition applied, the burden fell on VA to rebut the presumption with clear and unmistakable evidence that an injury or disease that manifested in service preexisted service. See George, 991 F.3d at 1229-30 (noting that VA’s 1970 version of the regulation, permitting VA to rebut the presumption of soundness with only clear and unmistakable evidence that the disorder preexisted service, prevailed until 2003); 38 U.S.C. § 311 (1970) (current version § 1111); » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Single Judge Application; Wise v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 517, 531 (2014); apply the correct standard of proof for determining that issue; The examiner rejected the scientific evidence because it did not definitely establish a causal link as a generally accepted principle. However, “Congress has not mandated that a medical principle have reached the level of scientific consensus to support a claim for VA benefits.” Wise v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 517, 531 (2014). Although the examiner rejected the scientific research evidence, “this did not relieve the Board of its obligation to consider and discuss the potentially favorable medical literature of record” that supported Mr. Lardinois’s theory of service connection and “to apply the correct standard of proof for determining that issue.” Id. at 531-32; see R. at 353-37 (scientific literature submitted by Mr. Lardinois). However, the Board did not discuss the scientific research evidence submitted by Mr. Lardinois; instead, it adopted the examiner’s opinion and his rejection of the scientific evidence without addressing or reconciling that opinion with the proper adjudicative standard of proof; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
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