Tag: Request

Secretary concession SMC part of every claim for increase; The Secretary further concedes that because SMC is an issue within an increased rating claim, the Board should have considered whether the appellant filed a claim for an increased disability rating for his left eye condition earlier than January 2014 or, at a minimum, considered 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2), which allows under certain circumstances an effective date up to 1 year prior to the date of a claim for increase. Secretary’s Br. at 9.; the Secretary further concedes that, to the extent that SMC may be considered part of a claim for increased compensation, see Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 118, 121 (1991) (concluding that the RO “should have inferred from the veteran’s request for an increase in benefits . . . a request for [SMC] whether or not it was placed in issue by the veteran”), the Board should have addressed whether the appellant sought SMC through an increased rating claim for his left eye disability prior to January 2014 or whether 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) applied. See Secretary’s Br. at 8-10. The Court will accept the Secretary’s concession, ;
Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the 1981 RO decision. Specifically, he contends that Wagner is an authoritative statement of what section 311 meant at the time of the 1981 RO decision. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6. The Court agrees with the appellant that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section 1111 in Wagner is an authoritative statement of what that statute has meant since the date of enactment in 1958. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d at 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We made clear . . . , that ‘[u]nlike changes in regulations and statutes, which are prospective, our interpretation of a statute is retrospective in that it explains what the statute has meant since the date of enactment.’” (quoting Patrick v. Nicholson, 242 F. App’x 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(remanding for further consideration of CUE request using the correct standard articulated in Wagner and directing remand to Board, if necessary, to determine whether the Secretary has rebutted the presumption of soundness by providing clear and unmistakable evidence that the presumption has been rebutted))); see also Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the appellant’s CUE request challenges the validity of a regulation but does not question the correct legal standard under the statute, and that “Wagner governs that issue”). Thus, the Court agrees with the appellant that the Board erred when it concluded that he could not challenge the correct legal standard that applies under section 1111 in the CUE context.;

Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the 1981 RO decision. Specifically, he contends that Wagner is an authoritative statement of what section 311 meant at the time of the 1981 RO decision. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6. The Court agrees with the appellant that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section 1111 in Wagner is an authoritative statement of what that statute has meant since the date of enactment in 1958. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d at 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We made clear . . . , that ‘[u]nlike changes in regulations and statutes, which are prospective, our interpretation of a statute is retrospective in that it explains what the statute has meant since the date of enactment.’” (quoting Patrick v. Nicholson, 242 F. App’x 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(remanding for further consideration of CUE request using the correct standard articulated in Wagner and directing remand to Board, if necessary, to determine whether the Secretary has rebutted the presumption of soundness by providing clear and unmistakable evidence that the presumption has been rebutted))); see also Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the appellant’s CUE request challenges the validity of a regulation but does not question the correct legal standard under the statute, and that “Wagner governs that issue”). Thus, the Court agrees with the appellant that the Board erred when it concluded that he could not challenge the correct legal standard that applies under section 1111 in the CUE context.;

Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the ...

Single Judge Application; pause adjudication; Groves v. McDonough, 33 Vet.App. 368, 379 (2021) (recognizing that the Board must honor a claimant’s request to pause adjudication of his or her claim);

  Read More Here Designated for electronic publication onlyUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMSNo. 20-7499WILLIAM G. FENNELL, APPELLANT,V.DENIS MCDONOUGH,SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.Before PIETSCH, Judge.MEMORANDUM DECISIONNote: Pursuant ...

The examination report must include • an up-to-date, brief, medical and industrial history from the date of discharge or last examination • a record of subjective complaints • a complete description of objective findings, stated in concrete terms • a diagnosis for each described condition[] • answer(s) to any question specifically included in the examination request • opinions specifically requested in the exam request • a diagnosis or notation that a chronic disease or disability was ruled out for each disability, complaint, or symptom listed on the examination request, and • the clinical findings required by the rating schedule for the evaluation of the specific disability being claimed. (For example, if a joint is being examined, the range of motion in degrees should be noted as part of the examination. If a cardiovascular condition is being examined, the metabolic equivalent expanded before fatigue, chest pain, and so on, result should be expressed.); M21-1MR, pt. III, subpt. iv, ch. 3, sec. D(f); In response to the Court’s inquiry, counsel for the Secretary stated that this provision is intended to assist VA adjudicators in determining what constitutes a sufficient report of examination for compensation and pension purposes, but conceded that a particular VA medical record may still qualify as a “report of examination” under § 3.157(b)(1) even if it is not as detailed as required by this M21-1MR provision.;

The examination report must include • an up-to-date, brief, medical and industrial history from the date of discharge or last examination • a record of subjective complaints • a complete description of objective findings, stated in concrete terms • a diagnosis for each described condition[] • answer(s) to any question specifically included in the examination request • opinions specifically requested in the exam request • a diagnosis or notation that a chronic disease or disability was ruled out for each disability, complaint, or symptom listed on the examination request, and • the clinical findings required by the rating schedule for the evaluation of the specific disability being claimed. (For example, if a joint is being examined, the range of motion in degrees should be noted as part of the examination. If a cardiovascular condition is being examined, the metabolic equivalent expanded before fatigue, chest pain, and so on, result should be expressed.); M21-1MR, pt. III, subpt. iv, ch. 3, sec. D(f); In response to the Court’s inquiry, counsel for the Secretary stated that this provision is intended to assist VA adjudicators in determining what constitutes a sufficient report of examination for compensation and pension purposes, but conceded that a particular VA medical record may still qualify as a “report of examination” under § 3.157(b)(1) even if it is not as detailed as required by this M21-1MR provision.;

Panel Application; the Veterans Benefits Administration Adjudication Procedures Manual (M21-1MR) are intended to describe the type of VA medical record that qualifies as a “report of examination.” In ...

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