Tag: Provide

Single Judge Application; reason and bases; Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001); failure discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant; Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994); the Board cannot “evade [its] statutory responsibility [to state the reasons or bases for its conclusions] merely by adopting [a medical opinion] as its own” where the medical opinion “fails to discuss all the evidence which appears to support [the] appellant’s position.” Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994). Gabrielson does not require that a medical opinion discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant, only that the Board, in relying on an opinion that does not do so, discuss any additional favorable evidence to comply with its duty to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its decision. See id.; 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); see also Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001) (holding that, although the Board must consider all of the evidence of record, “a discussion of all evidence is not required when . . . the Board has supported its decision with thorough reasons or bases regarding the relevant evidence”);
Panel Application; section 1155 directs the Secretary to establish in the rating schedule “ten grades of disability” for evaluating the severity of such conditions, the Secretary has provided less than ten levels of disability for most of the conditions listed in the schedule. See generally 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.71a – 4.150 (1992). Therefore, the schedular ratings established by the Secretary for compensation purposes may not in all cases provide a sufficiently comprehensive basis for determining when a measured worsening of a particular veteran’s condition in service constitutes an “increase in disability” for purposes of establishing service connection through aggravation under section 1153. This would seem to be so where the next higher rating is more than one decile greater. Furthermore, the rating-schedule provisions may not in all cases provide the most accurate or most logical basis for determining whether there has been an “increase in disability” during service. For example, with respect to organic mental disorders and psychoneurotic disorders, the rating schedule provides for disability ratings based on a finding that the condition causes “total”, “severe”, “considerable”, “definite”, or “mild” social and industrial impairment. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Codes 9300-9411 (1992);

Panel Application; section 1155 directs the Secretary to establish in the rating schedule “ten grades of disability” for evaluating the severity of such conditions, the Secretary has provided less than ten levels of disability for most of the conditions listed in the schedule. See generally 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.71a – 4.150 (1992). Therefore, the schedular ratings established by the Secretary for compensation purposes may not in all cases provide a sufficiently comprehensive basis for determining when a measured worsening of a particular veteran’s condition in service constitutes an “increase in disability” for purposes of establishing service connection through aggravation under section 1153. This would seem to be so where the next higher rating is more than one decile greater. Furthermore, the rating-schedule provisions may not in all cases provide the most accurate or most logical basis for determining whether there has been an “increase in disability” during service. For example, with respect to organic mental disorders and psychoneurotic disorders, the rating schedule provides for disability ratings based on a finding that the condition causes “total”, “severe”, “considerable”, “definite”, or “mild” social and industrial impairment. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Codes 9300-9411 (1992);

Panel Application; section 1155 directs the Secretary to establish in the rating schedule “ten grades of disability” for evaluating the severity of such conditions, the Secretary has provided less ...

Single Judge Application; This Court has held that “[l]ay testimony is competent . . . to establish the presence of observable symptomatology and ‘may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection.’” Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 303, 307 (2007) (quoting Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 465, 469 (1994)). As this Court has often noted, “symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology.” Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 488, 496 (1997); see also Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 15, 19 (1991) (noting that the “regulation requires continuity of symptomatology, not continuity of treatment”);
Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if ...

Dolbin v. McDonough, No. 21-2890(DATED: August 26, 2021); Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (VAIMA); Under VAIMA, appeals in RAMP are docketed in the order that they are received on a dedicated docket. Pub. L. No. 115-55, § 4(b)(3)(B)(i)(II), 131 Stat. 1105, 1121; VAIMA makes clear that RAMP operates independently of the existing “legacy” appeals system. Pub. L. No. 115-55, § 4(b)(1), 131 Stat. at 1120 (“The Secretary of Veterans Affairs may, under subsection (a)(1), carry out a program to provide the option of an alternative appeals process”); The Act also clearly sets out a first-come, first-served docketing system for RAMP appeals; Section 4(b)(3)(B) requires the Board to “maintain fully developed appeals on a separate docket than standard appeals” and to “decide fully developed appeals in the order that the fully developed appeals are received on the fully developed appeal docket.” Id. § 4(b)(3)(B)(i)(I)-(II), 131 Stat. at 1121;
Page 1 of 2 1 2