Tag: Judge

Single Judge Application; in Hensley v. Brown 5 Vet.App. 155, 157 (1993), the Court determined that the threshold for normal hearing is from 0 to 20 decibels, and higher threshold levels reflect some degree of hearing loss. Review of the May 1974 separation examination reflects that the appellant’s right ear hearing threshold at 4000 Hertz is 25 decibels, R. at 1237, and pursuant to Hensley v. Brown, this does reveal some level of hearing loss – especially when compared to the May 1972 enlistment examination which reflects his right ear hearing threshold at 4000 Hertz to be 5 decibels, R. at 1241.;
Single Judge Application; Ortiz v. McDonough; The Federal Circuit comprehensively considered whether the 2010 amendment to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) was liberalizing, ultimately determining that it was, Ortiz v. McDonough, 6 F.4th at 1275-1283, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 22305, at *16-38; The Federal Circuit specifically disapproved of this Court’s decision in Foreman, Ortiz v. McDonough, 6 F.4th at 1275-1283, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 22305, at *35-38;
Single Judge Application; flare-up; this Court’s caselaw and VA guidelines requiring VA medical examiners, in situations when direct observation is not possible, to opine on and quantify the effect of pain on functioning based on other evidence. See, e.g., Sharp v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 26, 35 (2017) (instructing VA examiners, when conducting examinations that do not take place during a flare-up, to “offer flare opinions based on estimates derived from information procured from relevant sources, including the lay statements of veterans”);
Single Judge Application; Pain limits ability to function; Deluca factors; in rating musculoskeletal disabilities, the Board must rely on VA examinations that consider whether and to what extent pain, or other factors listed in 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40 and 4.45 (the Deluca factors), limit a veteran’s ability to function. Sharp v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 26, 32 (2017). If pain causes functional loss, it “must be rated at the same level as if that functional loss were caused by some other factor.” Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 32, 37, (2011). For an examination to adequately capture functional loss, the examiner must opine whether pain could significantly limit functional ability and, if feasible, portray that opinion “‘in terms of the degree of additional range-of-motion loss due to pain on use or during flare-ups.’” Sharp, 29 Vet.App. at 32 (quoting Deluca v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 202, 206 (1995)). If an examiner is unable to offer a nonspeculative estimate of a veteran’s functional loss due to pain, the examiner must explain why such an opinion cannot be offered. Id. at 32;
Single Judge Application; reason and bases; Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001); failure discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant; Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994); the Board cannot “evade [its] statutory responsibility [to state the reasons or bases for its conclusions] merely by adopting [a medical opinion] as its own” where the medical opinion “fails to discuss all the evidence which appears to support [the] appellant’s position.” Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994). Gabrielson does not require that a medical opinion discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant, only that the Board, in relying on an opinion that does not do so, discuss any additional favorable evidence to comply with its duty to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its decision. See id.; 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); see also Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001) (holding that, although the Board must consider all of the evidence of record, “a discussion of all evidence is not required when . . . the Board has supported its decision with thorough reasons or bases regarding the relevant evidence”);
Single Judge Application; This Court has held that “[l]ay testimony is competent . . . to establish the presence of observable symptomatology and ‘may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection.’” Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 303, 307 (2007) (quoting Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 465, 469 (1994)). As this Court has often noted, “symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology.” Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 488, 496 (1997); see also Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 15, 19 (1991) (noting that the “regulation requires continuity of symptomatology, not continuity of treatment”);
Single Judge Application; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303; applicability Board decisions; Board decisions are “considered binding only with regard to the specific case decided.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303 (2019); prior decisions in other appeals “may be considered in a case to the extent that they reasonably relate to the case.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303;
Single Judge Application; the Board did not discuss the veteran’s contention that the RO’s request improperly described the contents of the record, constrained the August 2012 VA expert’s view of the file, and thereby essentially tainted the medical opinion; The Board is obligated to ensure that it provides appellants with fair process in the adjudication of their claims. See Smith v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 332, 337 (2020) (citing Thurber v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 119 (1993); Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 392-94 (1993)); In Smith, this Court held that the principle of fair process applies throughout the process of evidentiary development and is implicated when “the Board fails to procure a medical opinion in ‘an impartial, unbiased, and neutral manner’ when the opinion request contains a Board member’s own negative linkage opinion or otherwise suggests that an examiner should reach a predetermined conclusion.” Id. at 337-38 (citing Austin v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 547, 551-52 (1994));
Single Judge Application; English, 30 Vet.App. at 352-53; the Board must explain what it understands the terms “slight” and “moderate” in DC 5257 to mean so that appellant will understand why he was evaluated as he was, and the Court can review the Board’s decision; the Board focused on “objective evidence” in the VA medical opinions to support its conclusion that appellant’s instability was only “slight.”35 We can’t tell whether the Board faithfully applied English v. Wilkie or merely recited its holding concerning the lack of a requirement of objective evidence. On remand, the Board must ensure that it does not inappropriately downgrade evidence of instability merely because it is subjective. We stress again that it is inappropriate to categorically favor objective evidence of instability over subjective evidence of that condition. English, 30 Vet.App. at 352-53;
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