Tag: failed

FedCir; Regents is an application of the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and this case is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A), which uses the same “arbitrary, capricious” language; we have used APA jurisprudence in applying the Title 38 provision. See Euzebio v. McDonough, 989 F.3d 1305, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The Veterans Court must also review Board and VA determinations for ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘arbitrary [and] capricious’ decision making, including whether the Board or VA[] entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem . . . .” (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A) and State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43)); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 432 n.2 (2011) (“[T]he Veterans Court’s scope of review, § 7261, is similar to that of an Article III court reviewing agency action under the [APA] . . . .”); Whether an agency has failed to address an important aspect of a problem, and is arbitrary and capricious for that reason, can turn on the specific statutes and regulations that govern the agency, see Oregon Natural Re-sources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.1996), but that does not distinguish 38 U.S.C. § 7261 from 5 U.S.C. § 706;

FedCir; Regents is an application of the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and this case is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A), which uses the same “arbitrary, capricious” language; we have used APA jurisprudence in applying the Title 38 provision. See Euzebio v. McDonough, 989 F.3d 1305, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The Veterans Court must also review Board and VA determinations for ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘arbitrary [and] capricious’ decision making, including whether the Board or VA[] entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem . . . .” (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A) and State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43)); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 432 n.2 (2011) (“[T]he Veterans Court’s scope of review, § 7261, is similar to that of an Article III court reviewing agency action under the [APA] . . . .”); Whether an agency has failed to address an important aspect of a problem, and is arbitrary and capricious for that reason, can turn on the specific statutes and regulations that govern the agency, see Oregon Natural Re-sources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.1996), but that does not distinguish 38 U.S.C. § 7261 from 5 U.S.C. § 706;

FedCir; Regents is an application of the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and this case is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A), which uses ...

Single Judge Application; Tedesco v. Wilkie; implicit bias against lay evidence; The Board’s analysis is substantially similar to the Board’s analysis in Tedesco v. Wilkie, where the Board noted an appellant’s reports of knee instability but found medical evidence more probative. 31 Vet.App. 360, 367 (2019). We ultimately remanded that claim, stating that “[t]he Board fail[ed] to explain why the medical findings are more probative, other than to assert that the ‘specific medical tests . . . are designed to reveal instability . . . of the joints.’” Id. Just as in Tedesco, the Board’s statement here, that “[t]he DBQs were completed by medical professionals who formulated their conclusions based on a physical examination, review of the record, and interview of the Veteran,” fails to suggest any actual reasons or bases for finding the lay statements outweighed by “significant objective evidence,” other than an implicit bias against lay evidence and a preference for medical evidence. R. at 8. The Board also failed to explain why it considered the appellant’s lay statements “generalized.”;
Single Judge Application; substantive negative evidence; Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012); to the extent that the Board’s analysis may be read as implicitly finding him not credible because his service records did not confirm his testimony regarding the locations of his barracks and the flightline relative to the Udorn Air Base perimeter, the Board generally must “first establish a proper foundation for drawing inferences against a claimant from an absence of documentation.” Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Notably, a lack of confirmation is not the same as a contradiction of the claimant’s assertions. See Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012) (observing that the absence of evidence is not necessarily substantive negative evidence). And here, the Board did not explain whether and why it would be expected to find corroboration of the barracks and flightline locations relative to the perimeter in Mr. Cornelious’s service records. Thus, to the extent that the Board drew a negative inference from the lack of corroborating service records and relied on that inference to find Mr. Cornelious not credible, the Court concludes that the Board failed to lay a proper foundation. See Fountain, 27 Vet.App. at 272; Horn, 25 Vet.App. at 239;

Single Judge Application; substantive negative evidence; Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012); to the extent that the Board’s analysis may be read as implicitly finding him not credible because his service records did not confirm his testimony regarding the locations of his barracks and the flightline relative to the Udorn Air Base perimeter, the Board generally must “first establish a proper foundation for drawing inferences against a claimant from an absence of documentation.” Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Notably, a lack of confirmation is not the same as a contradiction of the claimant’s assertions. See Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012) (observing that the absence of evidence is not necessarily substantive negative evidence). And here, the Board did not explain whether and why it would be expected to find corroboration of the barracks and flightline locations relative to the perimeter in Mr. Cornelious’s service records. Thus, to the extent that the Board drew a negative inference from the lack of corroborating service records and relied on that inference to find Mr. Cornelious not credible, the Court concludes that the Board failed to lay a proper foundation. See Fountain, 27 Vet.App. at 272; Horn, 25 Vet.App. at 239;

Single Judge Application; substantive negative evidence; Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012); to the extent that the Board’s analysis may ...

Single Judge Application; failure define term or degree; Mr. Thornton cites Johnson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 245, 255 (2018), arguing that the Board must disclose the standard under which it is operating. Appellant’s Br. at 26. But Johnson focused on a situation where the Board failed to define a term of degree (specifically, “very frequent”) that could be applied inconsistently across similar cases without a clear definition. 30 Vet.App. at 255;