Tag: F3d

Single Judge Application; George v. McDonough, 991 F.3d 1227, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir. 2021) confirming that the law as it was understood at the time did not require VA to rebut the presumption of sound condition with clear and unmistakable evidence that the condition was not aggravated by service; 1970 presumption of sound condition; In 1970, VA’s implementing regulation did not require clear and unmistakable evidence of lack of aggravation by service for rebuttal. See 38 C.F.R. §3.304(b) (1970); Instead, if the presumption of sound condition applied, the burden fell on VA to rebut the presumption with clear and unmistakable evidence that an injury or disease that manifested in service preexisted service. See George, 991 F.3d at 1229-30 (noting that VA’s 1970 version of the regulation, permitting VA to rebut the presumption of soundness with only clear and unmistakable evidence that the disorder preexisted service, prevailed until 2003); 38 U.S.C. § 311 (1970) (current version § 1111); » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Single Judge Application; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Boggs v. Peake, 520 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir. 2008)); see Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399, 401-02 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In Murphy v. Wilkie, the Federal Circuit endorsed Clemons’s lenity rule and its teaching that a sympathetic reading of the scope of a veteran’s claim “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim.”;
Single Judge Application; § 5110; equitable tolling; On June 17, 2021, the Federal Circuit issued Arellano, which declined to revisit the rule that “equitable tolling is inapplicable to § 5110’s effective date rules.” Arellano v. McDonough, __ F.3d. , , 2021 WL 2460647at *18 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 2021) (6-6 decision) (Chen, J, concurring) (referencing Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (Fed. Cir. 2003));
Single Judge Application; In Rizzo v. Shinseki, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that VA need not affirmatively establish an examiner’s competency. 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009), overruled by Francway v. Wilkie, 940 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding that the presumption of competency requires nothing more than is required for veterans in other contexts—i.e., simply that the veteran raise the issue—and that, once the veteran raises such a challenge, the presumption has no further effect and VA must satisfy its burden of persuasion as to the examiner’s qualifications). But, to the extent that Francway did not overrule the holding in Rizzo, the issue here is not the examiner’s competency; In addition, in Sickels v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit found unpersuasive the veteran’s argument—that he should not be required to assert that the examiner was insufficiently informed—because, like in Rizzo, he had not raised that concern before the Board. 643 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that an examiner’s competency and whether the examiner was sufficiently informed were similar in that a veteran must challenge both and, because Mr. Sickels had not done so, the Board was not required to address the issue of whether the examiner understood the adjudicator’s instructions);

Single Judge Application; In Rizzo v. Shinseki, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that VA need not affirmatively establish an examiner’s competency. 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009), overruled by Francway v. Wilkie, 940 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding that the presumption of competency requires nothing more than is required for veterans in other contexts—i.e., simply that the veteran raise the issue—and that, once the veteran raises such a challenge, the presumption has no further effect and VA must satisfy its burden of persuasion as to the examiner’s qualifications). But, to the extent that Francway did not overrule the holding in Rizzo, the issue here is not the examiner’s competency; In addition, in Sickels v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit found unpersuasive the veteran’s argument—that he should not be required to assert that the examiner was insufficiently informed—because, like in Rizzo, he had not raised that concern before the Board. 643 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that an examiner’s competency and whether the examiner was sufficiently informed were similar in that a veteran must challenge both and, because Mr. Sickels had not done so, the Board was not required to address the issue of whether the examiner understood the adjudicator’s instructions);

Single Judge Application; In Rizzo v. Shinseki, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that VA need not affirmatively establish an examiner’s competency. 580 F.3d 1288, ...

Arellano v. McDonough, No. 2020-1073(Decided: June 17, 2021, PER CURIAM); equitable tolling with respect to 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1); Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which held that principles of equitable tolling are not applicable to the time period in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1);
Carr v. McDonough, No. 16-3438(Decided February 19, 2021); Carr v. Wilkie, 961 F.3d 1168, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2020), rev’g 31 Vet.App. 128 (2019); a person may receive benefits exceeding 48 months, notwithstanding section 3695’s express prohibition; § 21.9635(y) is not consistent with section 3319; 38 U.S.C. § 3319 (authorizing the transfer of unused benefits to a spouse orchildren); the Federal Circuit reversed, interpreting the phrase “may receive” as referring only to an initial calculation of a veteran’s entitlement and not to the amount of benefits that a person may, in fact, receive. It then concluded that the statute does not preclude an individual, who has accumulated and used a total of 48 months of educational benefits from a combination of chapters, from receiving an extension in benefits until the end of a semester. Carr, 961 F.3d at 1173;
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