Entitlement

Panel Application; educational benefits; 38 C.F.R. § 21.9635(o); Carr, 961 F.3d at 173; the Federal Circuit interpreted the phrase “may receive” as referring only to an initial calculation of a veteran’s entitlement and not to the amount of benefits that a person may, in fact, receive; It then concluded that the statute does not preclude an individual, who has accumulated and used a total of 48 months of educational benefits from a combination of chapters, from receiving an extension in benefits until the end of a semester. Carr, 961 F.3d at 173;

[ad_1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMSNo. 16-3438SAMANTHA E. CARR, APPELLANT,V.DENIS MCDONOUGH,SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.ROBERT M. CARR,…

2 years ago

Single Judge Application; Geib, 733 F.3d at 1354 (establishing that “applicable regulations place responsibility for the ultimate TDIU determination on the VA, not a medical examiner”); Board was therefore prohibited from characterizing their silence on the issue as substantive evidence against entitlement to TDIU; AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that “where a condition would not normally have been recorded, the Board may not consider the absence of [administrative record] evidence as substantive negative evidence of that condition.”); “[T]he absence of evidence on a particular question cannot be construed as negative evidence against a claimant unless there is a foundation in the record that demonstrates that such silence has a tendency to prove or disprove a relevant fact.” Delrio, 32 Vet.App. at 240 (citing Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015));

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; Geib, 733 F.3d at 1354 (establishing that “applicable regulations place responsibility for the ultimate TDIU…

2 years ago

Single Judge Application; The Board cannot avoid adjudicating an issue before it, here the proper rating, simply because it may also arise in a different claim. See Rice, 22 Vet.App. at 450-54 (clarifying that TDIU is not a “claim” but an entitlement to a total disability rating when certain qualifications are met); As appellant notes, the Board’s failure to address entitlement to TDIU based solely on the veteran’s migraine headaches was prejudicial because that entitlement may lead to eligibility for SMC under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s). See Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 280, 293 (2008) (“[S]ection 1114(s) does not limit ‘a service-connected disability rated as total’ to only a schedular rating of 100%, and the Secretary’s current regulation permits a [total disability rating based on individual unemployability] based on a single disability to satisfy the statutory requirement of a total rating.” (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s))); And VA has had a long-standing policy of considering SMC where it may apply, even if not explicitly raised. See Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 118, 121 (1991);

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; The Board cannot avoid adjudicating an issue before it, here the proper rating, simply because…

3 years ago

Single Judge Application; Lyles v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 107, 109 (2017); “entitlement to a separate evaluation in a given case depends on whether the manifestations of disability for which a separate evaluation is being sought have already been compensated by an assigned evaluation under a different DC.” Lyles v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 107, 109 (2017). Further, a veteran with a musculoskeletal disability, such as Mr. Wilson’s left knee disability, may be entitled to a higher disability evaluation than that supported by mechanical application of the schedule where there is evidence that the disability causes “additional functional loss—i.e., ‘the inability . . . to perform the normal working movements of the body with normal excursion, strength, speed, coordination[,] and endurance’— including as due to pain and/or other factors” or “reduction of a joint’s normal excursion of movement in different planes, including changes in the joint’s range of movement, strength, fatigability, or coordination.” Id. at 117-18 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 and citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.45); see Sharp v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 26, 32 (2017) (“Flare-ups . . . must be factored into an examiner’s assessment of functional loss”); Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 32, 36-37 (2011); DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 202, 205-07(1995).;

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; Lyles v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 107, 109 (2017); “entitlement to a separate evaluation in a…

3 years ago

Single Judge Application; Tadlock remand from Federal Circuit; overlapping signs or symptoms; Veterans of the Gulf War can establish entitlement to service connection on a presumptive basis for “a qualifying chronic disability” that arises during service or to a compensable degree before December 31, 2026. 38 U.S.C. § 1117; 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(1)(i) (2021). A “qualifying chronic disability” is one that results from either an “undiagnosed illness” or a “medically unexplained chronic multisymptom illness [(MUCMI)] that is defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(i)(A)-(B). A MUCMI, inturn, is defined as “a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology, that is characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs and has features such as fatigue, pain, disability out of proportion to physical findings, and inconsistent demonstration of laboratory abnormalities.” Id. § 3.317(a)(2)(ii);

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; Tadlock remand from Federal Circuit; overlapping signs or symptoms; Veterans of the Gulf War can…

3 years ago

Single Judge Application; hearing loss effective date; Swain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 219 (2015); in Swain v. McDonald the Court explained that 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 does not govern the effective date for hearing loss ratings. See 27 Vet.App. at 224-25. The Court held that the effective date for hearing loss may be earlier than the date of an audiometric test that satisfies the criteria under 38 C.F.R. § 4.85, and that, “unless otherwise specifically noted in the statute or regulation, [38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(3)] and [38 C.F.R.] § 3.400 govern the effective date for disability benefits claims.” Id. at 225. The Board noted some of Mr. Garcia’s statements about his worsening hearing loss before 2019, but the Board denied entitlement to a compensable rating before June 11, 2019, seemingly because the record did not contain any other “audiometric testing results during this portion of the appeal period which comply with 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 for rating purposes.” R. at 11.; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; hearing loss effective date; Swain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 219 (2015); in Swain v. McDonald…

3 years ago

“[P]rivate medical evidence since the initial exam that indicates the veteran’s medical history [] include[s] cold injury residuals [is] based upon his verbal history—not the evidence of record.” R. at 3583. There is no doubt that the RO’s distinction between the “evidence of record” and the veteran’s own statements was completely misleading at best. See 38 U.S.C.§ 5107(b) (requiring the Secretary to “consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case”); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that VA is required to give due consideration to all pertinent medical and lay evidence in evaluating a claim to disability or death benefits); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that””lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be considered, if submitted, when a veteran’s claim seeks disability benefits” and holding that, in certain situations, “competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself” to establish entitlement to such benefits). The language used in the request indicates that the veteran’s own statements are not “evidence of record” and would require at least corroboration in service medical records to be credible and probative. That is contrary to Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1335 (finding improper the Board’s determination that ‘lay statements lacked credibility merely because they were not corroborated by contemporaneous [SMRs]”).; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009); The RO’s request distinguished between…

3 years ago

Carr v. McDonough, No. 16-3438(Decided February 19, 2021); Carr v. Wilkie, 961 F.3d 1168, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2020), rev’g 31 Vet.App. 128 (2019); a person may receive benefits exceeding 48 months, notwithstanding section 3695’s express prohibition; § 21.9635(y) is not consistent with section 3319; 38 U.S.C. § 3319 (authorizing the transfer of unused benefits to a spouse orchildren); the Federal Circuit reversed, interpreting the phrase “may receive” as referring only to an initial calculation of a veteran’s entitlement and not to the amount of benefits that a person may, in fact, receive. It then concluded that the statute does not preclude an individual, who has accumulated and used a total of 48 months of educational benefits from a combination of chapters, from receiving an extension in benefits until the end of a semester. Carr, 961 F.3d at 1173;

[ad_1] Carr v. McDonough, No. 16-3438(Decided February 19, 2021); Carr v. Wilkie, 961 F.3d 1168, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2020), rev’g…

3 years ago

Agency Information Collection Activity: Application of Surviving Spouse or Child for REPS Benefits (Restored Entitlement Program for Survivors)

[ad_1] Veteran's Benefits Administration (VBA), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), is announcing an opportunity for public comment on the proposed…

3 years ago