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Tag: Date

Secretary concession SMC part of every claim for increase; The Secretary further concedes that because SMC is an issue within an increased rating claim, the Board should have considered whether the appellant filed a claim for an increased disability rating for his left eye condition earlier than January 2014 or, at a minimum, considered 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2), which allows under certain circumstances an effective date up to 1 year prior to the date of a claim for increase. Secretary’s Br. at 9.; the Secretary further concedes that, to the extent that SMC may be considered part of a claim for increased compensation, see Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 118, 121 (1991) (concluding that the RO “should have inferred from the veteran’s request for an increase in benefits . . . a request for [SMC] whether or not it was placed in issue by the veteran”), the Board should have addressed whether the appellant sought SMC through an increased rating claim for his left eye disability prior to January 2014 or whether 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) applied. See Secretary’s Br. at 8-10. The Court will accept the Secretary’s concession, ;

Secretary concession SMC part of every claim for increase; The Secretary further concedes that because SMC is an issue within an increased rating claim, the Board should have considered whether the appellant filed a claim for an increased disability rating for his left eye condition earlier than January 2014 or, at a minimum, considered 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2), which allows under certain circumstances an effective date up to 1 year prior to the date of a claim for increase. Secretary’s Br. at 9.; the Secretary further concedes that, to the extent that SMC may be considered part of a claim for increased compensation, see Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 118, 121 (1991) (concluding that the RO “should have inferred from the veteran’s request for an increase in benefits . . . a request for [SMC] whether or not it was placed in issue by the veteran”), the Board should have addressed whether the appellant sought SMC through an increased rating claim for his left eye disability prior to January 2014 or whether 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) applied. See Secretary’s Br. at 8-10. The Court will accept the Secretary’s concession, ;

by The Editor
July 13, 2022
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; Skip to content Posted in Uncategorized Tagged Case Law Post navigation Thanks for letting us know! This is how ...

Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the 1981 RO decision. Specifically, he contends that Wagner is an authoritative statement of what section 311 meant at the time of the 1981 RO decision. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6. The Court agrees with the appellant that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section 1111 in Wagner is an authoritative statement of what that statute has meant since the date of enactment in 1958. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d at 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We made clear . . . , that ‘[u]nlike changes in regulations and statutes, which are prospective, our interpretation of a statute is retrospective in that it explains what the statute has meant since the date of enactment.’” (quoting Patrick v. Nicholson, 242 F. App’x 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(remanding for further consideration of CUE request using the correct standard articulated in Wagner and directing remand to Board, if necessary, to determine whether the Secretary has rebutted the presumption of soundness by providing clear and unmistakable evidence that the presumption has been rebutted))); see also Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the appellant’s CUE request challenges the validity of a regulation but does not question the correct legal standard under the statute, and that “Wagner governs that issue”). Thus, the Court agrees with the appellant that the Board erred when it concluded that he could not challenge the correct legal standard that applies under section 1111 in the CUE context.;

Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the 1981 RO decision. Specifically, he contends that Wagner is an authoritative statement of what section 311 meant at the time of the 1981 RO decision. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6. The Court agrees with the appellant that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section 1111 in Wagner is an authoritative statement of what that statute has meant since the date of enactment in 1958. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d at 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We made clear . . . , that ‘[u]nlike changes in regulations and statutes, which are prospective, our interpretation of a statute is retrospective in that it explains what the statute has meant since the date of enactment.’” (quoting Patrick v. Nicholson, 242 F. App’x 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(remanding for further consideration of CUE request using the correct standard articulated in Wagner and directing remand to Board, if necessary, to determine whether the Secretary has rebutted the presumption of soundness by providing clear and unmistakable evidence that the presumption has been rebutted))); see also Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the appellant’s CUE request challenges the validity of a regulation but does not question the correct legal standard under the statute, and that “Wagner governs that issue”). Thus, the Court agrees with the appellant that the Board erred when it concluded that he could not challenge the correct legal standard that applies under section 1111 in the CUE context.;

by The Editor
November 12, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the ...

The examination report must include • an up-to-date, brief, medical and industrial history from the date of discharge or last examination • a record of subjective complaints • a complete description of objective findings, stated in concrete terms • a diagnosis for each described condition[] • answer(s) to any question specifically included in the examination request • opinions specifically requested in the exam request • a diagnosis or notation that a chronic disease or disability was ruled out for each disability, complaint, or symptom listed on the examination request, and • the clinical findings required by the rating schedule for the evaluation of the specific disability being claimed. (For example, if a joint is being examined, the range of motion in degrees should be noted as part of the examination. If a cardiovascular condition is being examined, the metabolic equivalent expanded before fatigue, chest pain, and so on, result should be expressed.); M21-1MR, pt. III, subpt. iv, ch. 3, sec. D(f); In response to the Court’s inquiry, counsel for the Secretary stated that this provision is intended to assist VA adjudicators in determining what constitutes a sufficient report of examination for compensation and pension purposes, but conceded that a particular VA medical record may still qualify as a “report of examination” under § 3.157(b)(1) even if it is not as detailed as required by this M21-1MR provision.;

The examination report must include • an up-to-date, brief, medical and industrial history from the date of discharge or last examination • a record of subjective complaints • a complete description of objective findings, stated in concrete terms • a diagnosis for each described condition[] • answer(s) to any question specifically included in the examination request • opinions specifically requested in the exam request • a diagnosis or notation that a chronic disease or disability was ruled out for each disability, complaint, or symptom listed on the examination request, and • the clinical findings required by the rating schedule for the evaluation of the specific disability being claimed. (For example, if a joint is being examined, the range of motion in degrees should be noted as part of the examination. If a cardiovascular condition is being examined, the metabolic equivalent expanded before fatigue, chest pain, and so on, result should be expressed.); M21-1MR, pt. III, subpt. iv, ch. 3, sec. D(f); In response to the Court’s inquiry, counsel for the Secretary stated that this provision is intended to assist VA adjudicators in determining what constitutes a sufficient report of examination for compensation and pension purposes, but conceded that a particular VA medical record may still qualify as a “report of examination” under § 3.157(b)(1) even if it is not as detailed as required by this M21-1MR provision.;

by The Editor
October 19, 2021
0

Panel Application; the Veterans Benefits Administration Adjudication Procedures Manual (M21-1MR) are intended to describe the type of VA medical record that qualifies as a “report of examination.” In ...

Single Judge Application; Bailey v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 188, 204 (2021) (noting that an RO decision granting benefits could not divest the Board of jurisdiction over the initial appeal and that, on remand, the appellant was entitled to have his appeal processed to completion thus preserving the possibility of an earlier effective date);

by The Editor
October 16, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; Bailey v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 188, 204 (2021) (noting that an RO decision granting benefits could not divest the Board of jurisdiction over the initial ...

Single Judge Application; hearing loss effective date; Swain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 219 (2015); in Swain v. McDonald the Court explained that 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 does not govern the effective date for hearing loss ratings. See 27 Vet.App. at 224-25. The Court held that the effective date for hearing loss may be earlier than the date of an audiometric test that satisfies the criteria under 38 C.F.R. § 4.85, and that, “unless otherwise specifically noted in the statute or regulation, [38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(3)] and [38 C.F.R.] § 3.400 govern the effective date for disability benefits claims.” Id. at 225. The Board noted some of Mr. Garcia’s statements about his worsening hearing loss before 2019, but the Board denied entitlement to a compensable rating before June 11, 2019, seemingly because the record did not contain any other “audiometric testing results during this portion of the appeal period which comply with 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 for rating purposes.” R. at 11.; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

Single Judge Application; hearing loss effective date; Swain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 219 (2015); in Swain v. McDonald the Court explained that 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 does not govern the effective date for hearing loss ratings. See 27 Vet.App. at 224-25. The Court held that the effective date for hearing loss may be earlier than the date of an audiometric test that satisfies the criteria under 38 C.F.R. § 4.85, and that, “unless otherwise specifically noted in the statute or regulation, [38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(3)] and [38 C.F.R.] § 3.400 govern the effective date for disability benefits claims.” Id. at 225. The Board noted some of Mr. Garcia’s statements about his worsening hearing loss before 2019, but the Board denied entitlement to a compensable rating before June 11, 2019, seemingly because the record did not contain any other “audiometric testing results during this portion of the appeal period which comply with 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 for rating purposes.” R. at 11.; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA

by The Editor
October 6, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; hearing loss effective date; Swain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 219 (2015); in Swain v. McDonald the Court explained that 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 does not ...

Single Judge Application; § 5110; equitable tolling; On June 17, 2021, the Federal Circuit issued Arellano, which declined to revisit the rule that “equitable tolling is inapplicable to § 5110’s effective date rules.” Arellano v. McDonough, __ F.3d. , , 2021 WL 2460647at *18 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 2021) (6-6 decision) (Chen, J, concurring) (referencing Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (Fed. Cir. 2003));

by The Editor
August 31, 2021
0

Single Judge Application; § 5110; equitable tolling; On June 17, 2021, the Federal Circuit issued Arellano, which declined to revisit the rule that “equitable tolling is inapplicable to § ...

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