Tag: claimants

Single Judge Application; pause adjudication; Groves v. McDonough, 33 Vet.App. 368, 379 (2021) (recognizing that the Board must honor a claimant’s request to pause adjudication of his or her claim);

Single Judge Application; pause adjudication; Groves v. McDonough, 33 Vet.App. 368, 379 (2021) (recognizing that the Board must honor a claimant’s request to pause adjudication of his or her claim);

  Read More Here Designated for electronic publication onlyUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMSNo. 20-7499WILLIAM G. FENNELL, APPELLANT,V.DENIS MCDONOUGH,SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.Before PIETSCH, Judge.MEMORANDUM DECISIONNote: Pursuant to ...

Decision Assessment Document; Shea v. Wilkie, June 20, 2019, 926 F. 3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019); where claimant’s filings refer to specific medical records, and those records contain a reasonable ascertainable diagnosis of a disability, the claimant has raised an informal claim for that disability under 38 C.F.R. 3.155(a);
Single Judge Application; the ultimate “lesson of our cases is that, while a pro se claimant’s ‘claim must identify the benefit sought,’ the identification need not be explicit in the claim-stating documents, but can also be found indirectly through examination of evidence to which those documents themselves point when sympathetically read.” Shea v. Wilkie, 926 F.3d 1362, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Here, the claim-stating documents pointed, when sympathetically viewed, to a history of symptoms of abdominal pain that yielded a diagnosis of gastritis. And that’s not all. The veteran’s gastritis was expressly linked to service by VA’s own medical examiner—in the context of an examination sought by the Agency as part of the development of Mr. Martinelli’s other claims.; The Secretary says the veteran is out of his depth in suggesting to the Court that melatonin use indicates sleep issues. But even if that were true, the veteran retorts, the Secretary forgets the Court’s ability to take judicial notice of facts generally known. See Tagupa v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 95, 100-01 (2014). Indeed, one need look no further than a basic medical dictionary to conclude that his in-service prescription was favorable, material evidence. Melatonin is “a hormone . . . implicated in the regulation of sleep, mood, puberty, and ovarian cycles. It has been tried therapeutically for a number of conditions, including insomnia and jet lag.” DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1110 (33d ed. 2020). The Board has a responsibility to explain why it rejects favorable, material evidence. Garner v. Tran, 33 Vet.App. 241, 250 (2021).;

Single Judge Application; the ultimate “lesson of our cases is that, while a pro se claimant’s ‘claim must identify the benefit sought,’ the identification need not be explicit in the claim-stating documents, but can also be found indirectly through examination of evidence to which those documents themselves point when sympathetically read.” Shea v. Wilkie, 926 F.3d 1362, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Here, the claim-stating documents pointed, when sympathetically viewed, to a history of symptoms of abdominal pain that yielded a diagnosis of gastritis. And that’s not all. The veteran’s gastritis was expressly linked to service by VA’s own medical examiner—in the context of an examination sought by the Agency as part of the development of Mr. Martinelli’s other claims.; The Secretary says the veteran is out of his depth in suggesting to the Court that melatonin use indicates sleep issues. But even if that were true, the veteran retorts, the Secretary forgets the Court’s ability to take judicial notice of facts generally known. See Tagupa v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 95, 100-01 (2014). Indeed, one need look no further than a basic medical dictionary to conclude that his in-service prescription was favorable, material evidence. Melatonin is “a hormone . . . implicated in the regulation of sleep, mood, puberty, and ovarian cycles. It has been tried therapeutically for a number of conditions, including insomnia and jet lag.” DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1110 (33d ed. 2020). The Board has a responsibility to explain why it rejects favorable, material evidence. Garner v. Tran, 33 Vet.App. 241, 250 (2021).;

Single Judge Application; the ultimate “lesson of our cases is that, while a pro se claimant’s ‘claim must identify the benefit sought,’ the identification need not be explicit in ...

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed in processing that claim; claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim; The Board did not, however, address the reasonably raised issue of whether the veteran’s specific claim for tinnitus encompassed a claim for a vestibular condition manifesting in dizziness, as required by Clemons. In Clemons, the Court explained that, because lay claimants generally lack the medical knowledge to narrow the universe of a claim to a particular diagnosis, VA “should construe a claim based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert, self-represented claimant and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth,” and factors relevant to that inquiry include “the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Id. The Court ultimately held that the Board may not deny a claim because a lay claimant’s hypothesized diagnosis proves incorrect; rather, the Board must “confront[] the difficult questions of what current []condition actually exist[s] and whether it was incurred in or aggravated by service.” Id. at 6. In so doing, the Board must make “affirmative finding[s] as to the nature of the [claimant’s] condition.” Id. In short, “the fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Id.; see generally Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim”).;

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed in processing that claim; claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim; The Board did not, however, address the reasonably raised issue of whether the veteran’s specific claim for tinnitus encompassed a claim for a vestibular condition manifesting in dizziness, as required by Clemons. In Clemons, the Court explained that, because lay claimants generally lack the medical knowledge to narrow the universe of a claim to a particular diagnosis, VA “should construe a claim based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert, self-represented claimant and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth,” and factors relevant to that inquiry include “the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Id. The Court ultimately held that the Board may not deny a claim because a lay claimant’s hypothesized diagnosis proves incorrect; rather, the Board must “confront[] the difficult questions of what current []condition actually exist[s] and whether it was incurred in or aggravated by service.” Id. at 6. In so doing, the Board must make “affirmative finding[s] as to the nature of the [claimant’s] condition.” Id. In short, “the fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Id.; see generally Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim”).;

Single Judge Application; tinnitus; Murphy v. Wilkie, 983 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (endorsing Clemons and explaining that “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings; evidence developed ...

the claimant’s description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim.” Clemons, 23 Vet.App. at 5. “[T]he claimant’s intent in filing a claim is paramount to construing its breadth.” Id. To effectuate that intent, “VA shall afford lenity to a veteran’s filings that fail to enumerate precisely the disabilities included within the bounds of a claim,” which “is best accomplished by looking to the veteran’s reasonable expectations in filing the claim and the evidence developed in processing that claim.” Murphy, 983 F.3d at 1318. “[T]he fact that the [claimant] may be wrong about the nature of his [or her] condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate the claim.” Clemons, 23 Vet.App. at 6.; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Single Judge Application; substantive negative evidence; Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012); to the extent that the Board’s analysis may be read as implicitly finding him not credible because his service records did not confirm his testimony regarding the locations of his barracks and the flightline relative to the Udorn Air Base perimeter, the Board generally must “first establish a proper foundation for drawing inferences against a claimant from an absence of documentation.” Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Notably, a lack of confirmation is not the same as a contradiction of the claimant’s assertions. See Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012) (observing that the absence of evidence is not necessarily substantive negative evidence). And here, the Board did not explain whether and why it would be expected to find corroboration of the barracks and flightline locations relative to the perimeter in Mr. Cornelious’s service records. Thus, to the extent that the Board drew a negative inference from the lack of corroborating service records and relied on that inference to find Mr. Cornelious not credible, the Court concludes that the Board failed to lay a proper foundation. See Fountain, 27 Vet.App. at 272; Horn, 25 Vet.App. at 239;

Single Judge Application; substantive negative evidence; Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012); to the extent that the Board’s analysis may be read as implicitly finding him not credible because his service records did not confirm his testimony regarding the locations of his barracks and the flightline relative to the Udorn Air Base perimeter, the Board generally must “first establish a proper foundation for drawing inferences against a claimant from an absence of documentation.” Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Notably, a lack of confirmation is not the same as a contradiction of the claimant’s assertions. See Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012) (observing that the absence of evidence is not necessarily substantive negative evidence). And here, the Board did not explain whether and why it would be expected to find corroboration of the barracks and flightline locations relative to the perimeter in Mr. Cornelious’s service records. Thus, to the extent that the Board drew a negative inference from the lack of corroborating service records and relied on that inference to find Mr. Cornelious not credible, the Court concludes that the Board failed to lay a proper foundation. See Fountain, 27 Vet.App. at 272; Horn, 25 Vet.App. at 239;

Single Judge Application; substantive negative evidence; Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 272 (2015); Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 239 (2012); to the extent that the Board’s analysis may ...