Tag: Board

Single Judge Application; Bailey v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 188, 204 (2021) (noting that an RO decision granting benefits could not divest the Board of jurisdiction over the initial appeal and that, on remand, the appellant was entitled to have his appeal processed to completion thus preserving the possibility of an earlier effective date);
Single Judge Application; Tedesco v. Wilkie; implicit bias against lay evidence; The Board’s analysis is substantially similar to the Board’s analysis in Tedesco v. Wilkie, where the Board noted an appellant’s reports of knee instability but found medical evidence more probative. 31 Vet.App. 360, 367 (2019). We ultimately remanded that claim, stating that “[t]he Board fail[ed] to explain why the medical findings are more probative, other than to assert that the ‘specific medical tests . . . are designed to reveal instability . . . of the joints.’” Id. Just as in Tedesco, the Board’s statement here, that “[t]he DBQs were completed by medical professionals who formulated their conclusions based on a physical examination, review of the record, and interview of the Veteran,” fails to suggest any actual reasons or bases for finding the lay statements outweighed by “significant objective evidence,” other than an implicit bias against lay evidence and a preference for medical evidence. R. at 8. The Board also failed to explain why it considered the appellant’s lay statements “generalized.”;
Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if ...

Single Judge Application; Shoemaker v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. 248, 253 (1992); Bankhead, 29 Vet.App. at 18-19; the criteria listed by the Board are those pertaining to the 100% rating under § 4.130, not the 70% rating the Board mislabeled it as. As a result, the Board didn’t properly consider if the veteran’s PTSD was more severe than a 50% rating but less severe than a 100% rating. When the veteran specifically requests an increase in his or her rating, the Board has an obligation to explain not only why the symptoms comport with the assigned rating criteria, but also why they don’t comport with the next higher disability rating criteria. Shoemaker v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. 248, 253 (1992); Bankhead, 29 Vet.App. at 18-19.;
Single Judge Application; hearing loss effective date; Swain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 219 (2015); in Swain v. McDonald the Court explained that 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 does not govern the effective date for hearing loss ratings. See 27 Vet.App. at 224-25. The Court held that the effective date for hearing loss may be earlier than the date of an audiometric test that satisfies the criteria under 38 C.F.R. § 4.85, and that, “unless otherwise specifically noted in the statute or regulation, [38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(3)] and [38 C.F.R.] § 3.400 govern the effective date for disability benefits claims.” Id. at 225. The Board noted some of Mr. Garcia’s statements about his worsening hearing loss before 2019, but the Board denied entitlement to a compensable rating before June 11, 2019, seemingly because the record did not contain any other “audiometric testing results during this portion of the appeal period which comply with 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 for rating purposes.” R. at 11.; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Single Judge Application; Board’s use of double negatives (“not shown” and “unable”); In Bowling, the Court found that the Board’s use of double negatives (“not shown” and “unable”) to suggest the feasibility of some of the veteran’s past occupations revealed that the Board relied on the lack of evidence rather than on any affirmative evidence of employability and that, with no such evidence, the Board’s speculation could not sustain a TDIU denial. Id. at 8.; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Single Judge Application; Wise v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 517, 531 (2014); apply the correct standard of proof for determining that issue; The examiner rejected the scientific evidence because it did not definitely establish a causal link as a generally accepted principle. However, “Congress has not mandated that a medical principle have reached the level of scientific consensus to support a claim for VA benefits.” Wise v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 517, 531 (2014). Although the examiner rejected the scientific research evidence, “this did not relieve the Board of its obligation to consider and discuss the potentially favorable medical literature of record” that supported Mr. Lardinois’s theory of service connection and “to apply the correct standard of proof for determining that issue.” Id. at 531-32; see R. at 353-37 (scientific literature submitted by Mr. Lardinois). However, the Board did not discuss the scientific research evidence submitted by Mr. Lardinois; instead, it adopted the examiner’s opinion and his rejection of the scientific evidence without addressing or reconciling that opinion with the proper adjudicative standard of proof; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Panel Application; Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 32, 44 (2011) (holding that, for a VA joints exam to be adequate, the examiner must portray the extent of functional loss or limitation due to pain and the other factors set forth in 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40 and 4.45, including pain with repetitive use and on flare-up); see also Sharp v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 26, 34-35 (2017) (holding that an examiner’s refusal to offer a flare opinion without resort to speculation is adequate only when it is “clear that [it] is predicated on a lack of knowledge among the ‘medical community at large’ and not the insufficient knowledge of the specific examiner”); the Board erred by relying on the September 2017 VA exam, which they consider inadequate because the examiner did not adequately address why he could not opine, without resorting to speculation, whether pain weakness, fatigability, or incoordination limited Mr. Andrews’s functional ability with repeated use over time.15; » HadIt.com For Veterans Who’ve Had It With The VA
Single Judge Application; “The [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Federal Circuit made it clear that the Board is not bound by [M21-1] ; Overton, 30 Vet.App. at 264 (“[T]he Board is required to discuss any relevant provisions contained in the M21-1 . . . , but because it is not bound by those provisions, it must make its own determination before it chooses to rely on an M21-l provision . . . .”); It is unclear how the Board came to this conclusion that consistent and prolonged exposure was required because that language is not found within the M21-1 provision that was provided to appellant as a reference for establishing presumptive service connection; Andrews v. McDonough, __ Vet.App. , , No. 19-0352, 2021 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1091, at *17-20 (June 22, 2021) (“[T]he VA ma y [not] tell a veteran how to establish a service connection for his [condition] only to move the goalposts once he has done so. This kind of goalpost-moving does not reflect an optimal mode of administrative decisionmaking.” (quoting Hudick v. Wilkie, 755 F. App’x 998, 1006-07 (Fed. Cir. 2018)));
Dolbin v. McDonough, No. 21-2890(DATED: August 26, 2021); Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (VAIMA); Under VAIMA, appeals in RAMP are docketed in the order that they are received on a dedicated docket. Pub. L. No. 115-55, § 4(b)(3)(B)(i)(II), 131 Stat. 1105, 1121; VAIMA makes clear that RAMP operates independently of the existing “legacy” appeals system. Pub. L. No. 115-55, § 4(b)(1), 131 Stat. at 1120 (“The Secretary of Veterans Affairs may, under subsection (a)(1), carry out a program to provide the option of an alternative appeals process”); The Act also clearly sets out a first-come, first-served docketing system for RAMP appeals; Section 4(b)(3)(B) requires the Board to “maintain fully developed appeals on a separate docket than standard appeals” and to “decide fully developed appeals in the order that the fully developed appeals are received on the fully developed appeal docket.” Id. § 4(b)(3)(B)(i)(I)-(II), 131 Stat. at 1121;
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