Appellants

Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board erred in its determination that no CUE existed in the 1981 RO decision. Specifically, he contends that Wagner is an authoritative statement of what section 311 meant at the time of the 1981 RO decision. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6. The Court agrees with the appellant that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section 1111 in Wagner is an authoritative statement of what that statute has meant since the date of enactment in 1958. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d at 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We made clear . . . , that ‘[u]nlike changes in regulations and statutes, which are prospective, our interpretation of a statute is retrospective in that it explains what the statute has meant since the date of enactment.’” (quoting Patrick v. Nicholson, 242 F. App’x 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(remanding for further consideration of CUE request using the correct standard articulated in Wagner and directing remand to Board, if necessary, to determine whether the Secretary has rebutted the presumption of soundness by providing clear and unmistakable evidence that the presumption has been rebutted))); see also Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the appellant’s CUE request challenges the validity of a regulation but does not question the correct legal standard under the statute, and that “Wagner governs that issue”). Thus, the Court agrees with the appellant that the Board erred when it concluded that he could not challenge the correct legal standard that applies under section 1111 in the CUE context.;

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; section 311 meant in 1981; CUE; presumption of soundness; The appellant argues that the Board…

2 years ago

Single Judge Application; in Hensley v. Brown 5 Vet.App. 155, 157 (1993), the Court determined that the threshold for normal hearing is from 0 to 20 decibels, and higher threshold levels reflect some degree of hearing loss. Review of the May 1974 separation examination reflects that the appellant’s right ear hearing threshold at 4000 Hertz is 25 decibels, R. at 1237, and pursuant to Hensley v. Brown, this does reveal some level of hearing loss – especially when compared to the May 1972 enlistment examination which reflects his right ear hearing threshold at 4000 Hertz to be 5 decibels, R. at 1241.;

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; in Hensley v. Brown 5 Vet.App. 155, 157 (1993), the Court determined that the threshold…

2 years ago

Single Judge Application; reason and bases; Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001); failure discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant; Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994); the Board cannot “evade [its] statutory responsibility [to state the reasons or bases for its conclusions] merely by adopting [a medical opinion] as its own” where the medical opinion “fails to discuss all the evidence which appears to support [the] appellant’s position.” Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994). Gabrielson does not require that a medical opinion discuss all the evidence favorable to a claimant, only that the Board, in relying on an opinion that does not do so, discuss any additional favorable evidence to comply with its duty to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its decision. See id.; 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); see also Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001) (holding that, although the Board must consider all of the evidence of record, “a discussion of all evidence is not required when . . . the Board has supported its decision with thorough reasons or bases regarding the relevant evidence”);

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; reason and bases; Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 143, 149 (2001); failure discuss all…

2 years ago

Single Judge Application; the Board did not discuss the veteran’s contention that the RO’s request improperly described the contents of the record, constrained the August 2012 VA expert’s view of the file, and thereby essentially tainted the medical opinion; The Board is obligated to ensure that it provides appellants with fair process in the adjudication of their claims. See Smith v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 332, 337 (2020) (citing Thurber v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 119 (1993); Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 392-94 (1993)); In Smith, this Court held that the principle of fair process applies throughout the process of evidentiary development and is implicated when “the Board fails to procure a medical opinion in ‘an impartial, unbiased, and neutral manner’ when the opinion request contains a Board member’s own negative linkage opinion or otherwise suggests that an examiner should reach a predetermined conclusion.” Id. at 337-38 (citing Austin v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 547, 551-52 (1994));

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; the Board did not discuss the veteran’s contention that the RO’s request improperly described the…

3 years ago

Single Judge Application; English, 30 Vet.App. at 352-53; the Board must explain what it understands the terms “slight” and “moderate” in DC 5257 to mean so that appellant will understand why he was evaluated as he was, and the Court can review the Board’s decision; the Board focused on “objective evidence” in the VA medical opinions to support its conclusion that appellant’s instability was only “slight.”35 We can’t tell whether the Board faithfully applied English v. Wilkie or merely recited its holding concerning the lack of a requirement of objective evidence. On remand, the Board must ensure that it does not inappropriately downgrade evidence of instability merely because it is subjective. We stress again that it is inappropriate to categorically favor objective evidence of instability over subjective evidence of that condition. English, 30 Vet.App. at 352-53;

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; English, 30 Vet.App. at 352-53; the Board must explain what it understands the terms “slight”…

3 years ago

Single Judge Application; In Chavis, the Court explained that the ankylosis requirement in 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a “can be met with evidence of the functional equivalent of ankylosis during a flare.” Chavis v. McDonough, _ Vet.App. _ , No. 19-2928, 2021 WL 1432578, at *1 (Apr. 16, 2021) (emphasis added); Chavis changes the landscape; examiner did not consider whether the functional limitations appellant experienced regularly and during the examination were akin to a functional equivalent of ankylosis. Though the Board did mention appellant’s daily flare-ups, pain, and functional limitations of his neck, the Board did not address how this potentially favorable evidence compared to ankylosis;

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; In Chavis, the Court explained that the ankylosis requirement in 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a “can…

3 years ago

Single Judge Application; Tedesco v. Wilkie; implicit bias against lay evidence; The Board’s analysis is substantially similar to the Board’s analysis in Tedesco v. Wilkie, where the Board noted an appellant’s reports of knee instability but found medical evidence more probative. 31 Vet.App. 360, 367 (2019). We ultimately remanded that claim, stating that “[t]he Board fail[ed] to explain why the medical findings are more probative, other than to assert that the ‘specific medical tests . . . are designed to reveal instability . . . of the joints.’” Id. Just as in Tedesco, the Board’s statement here, that “[t]he DBQs were completed by medical professionals who formulated their conclusions based on a physical examination, review of the record, and interview of the Veteran,” fails to suggest any actual reasons or bases for finding the lay statements outweighed by “significant objective evidence,” other than an implicit bias against lay evidence and a preference for medical evidence. R. at 8. The Board also failed to explain why it considered the appellant’s lay statements “generalized.”;

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; Tedesco v. Wilkie; implicit bias against lay evidence; The Board’s analysis is substantially similar to…

3 years ago

Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence.18 Here, we simply do not know the weight, if any, the Board gave this evidence in assigning a rating for appellant’s GERD. It is important for the Board to make such a finding in the first instance.19 We recognize that the Secretary offers several arguments about why extraschedular referral is not warranted for appellant’s GERD. However, it is ultimately not his prerogative to provide an explanation that the Board did not. As we have often said, the Secretary cannot make up for the Board’s deficient statement of reasons or bases.20; 19 See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where additional findings of fact are necessary regarding mattes open to debate, the proper action is for the Veterans Court is to remand to the Board for consideration of those facts in the first instance.”).; 20 See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action.’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); McCray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 243, 258 (2019) (“[T]he Secretary’s impermissible post-hoc rationalization cannot make up for shortcomings in the Board’s assessment.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 267, 277 (2018) (holding that the “Court cannot accept the Secretary’s post-hoc rationalizations” to cure the Board’s reasons-or-bases errors), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 63, 73 (2015) (“[I]t is not the task of the Secretary to rewrite the Board’s decision through his pleadings filed in this Court.”).;

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; deficient reasons and bases; It is the Board’s responsibility as factfinder to assess and weigh…

3 years ago

Single Judge Application; failure define term or degree; Mr. Thornton cites Johnson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 245, 255 (2018), arguing that the Board must disclose the standard under which it is operating. Appellant’s Br. at 26. But Johnson focused on a situation where the Board failed to define a term of degree (specifically, “very frequent”) that could be applied inconsistently across similar cases without a clear definition. 30 Vet.App. at 255;

[ad_1] Single Judge Application; failure define term or degree; Mr. Thornton cites Johnson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 245, 255 (2018),…

3 years ago